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THE PING-PONG OLYMPICS OF ANTISUIT
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ABSTRACT
In the past two years, antisuit injunctions (ASIs) and subsequent legal
proceedings associated with standard-essential patents (SEPs) subject to
fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) commitments have
proliferated in multiple jurisdictions. This phenomenon reveals not only
the transnational nature of technical standards and FRAND-encumbered
SEPs but also the jurisdictional tension between different national courts.
This Article explains the emergence of ASIs in FRAND scenarios and
recent developments in six jurisdictions with major interests in standard
development and adoption. Countries have developed different approaches to ASIs based on their own domestic rules and interests. We
believe that to promote technical compatibility and international comity,
it is necessary to facilitate legal compatibility between jurisdictions at the
policy level. Currently, courts in multiple jurisdictions are competing to
grant ASIs and anti-anti-suit injunctions (AASIs), leading to fragmented
decisions and significant costs for global standardization. We propose to
include an exclusive forum selection clause in the policy documents of
standard-setting organizations (SSOs) to reduce undesirable transaction
costs stemming from ASIs and subsequent legal actions. Our proposal is
more realistic and cost-effective than others concerning FRAND dispute
resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An antisuit injunction (ASI), originating from the common law refers to
a court order that forbids a party from initiating, continuing, or participating
in judicial proceedings in foreign fora. 1 The landscape of ASIs has dramatically changed over the past few years in international disputes involving
1.
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 551 (6th ed. 2018); Enrico Bonadio & Luke McDonagh, Paris Court
Grants an SEP Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction in IPCom v Lenovo: A Worrying Decision in Uncertain
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standard-essential patents (SEPs) and their owners’ fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) commitments; such ASIs turn out to be one of the
most difficult issues at the intersection of intellectual property (IP) law and
private international law. 2 Given the international nature of technical standards and FRAND licenses, courts in multiple countries often have concurrent
jurisdictions over the same FRAND dispute, leading to potential jurisdictional conflicts. Parallel FRAND litigation in multiple jurisdictions has become increasingly common in the past few years, and we have witnessed the
aggressive scrambling of exclusive jurisdiction by national courts via the use
of an unprecedented number of ASIs. Most notably, we have seen:
1. aggressive use of ASIs was first initiated by U.S. courts, a jurisdiction that has a relatively liberal tradition of granting ASIs
compared to other common law jurisdictions; 3
2. the U.S. ASIs then triggered some surprising responses by other
jurisdictions. China, for example, responded by issuing its own
ASI for the first time in history, 4 notwithstanding that it is a civil
law jurisdiction that lacked legislation to enable its courts to issue ASIs; 5
Times?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 149, 150 (2020); Jorge L. Contreras & Michael A. Eixenberger, The Anti-Suit Injunction—A Transnational Remedy for Multi-jurisdictional SEP Litigation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION,
ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 451, 451–53 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017); Jorge L. Contreras, The
New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Global Race to the Bottom in Disputes over Standards-Essential Patents, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 251,, 265 (2019)
[hereinafter Contreras, New Extraterritoriality]; Haris Tsilikas, Anti-Suit Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents: The Emerging Gap in International Patent Enforcement, 16 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. & PRAC. 729, 730 (2021).
2.
ASI has been regarded as the form of provisional relief in the context of international
litigation that has sparked the most interest and controversy. See George A. Bermann, The Use
of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 589
(1990).
3.
The first FRAND ASI was issued by a U.S. court in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). For the
liberal tradition of U.S. courts to grant ASI, see TREVOR C. HARTLEY, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 279–80 (3d ed. 2020); Bermann, supra note 2, at 590 (“American
courts do not consider it improper to order a person subject to their personal jurisdiction to
perform, or refrain from performing, a specified act outside the forum, provided they have a
sufficient interest in the performance of that act and intervention is warranted.”).
4.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Kang Wensen Wuxian Xuke Youxian Gongsi
(ॾѪᢰᵟᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ) [Huawei Tech. Co. v. Conversant Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L.], 2019 Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 732, 733, 734 (Sup. People’s Ct.
Aug. 28, 2020) (China). An unofficial English translation of the judgment is available at
https://patentlyo.com/media/2020/10/Huawei-V.-Conversant-judgment-translated-10-172020.pdf.
5.
See Sophia Tang, Anti-Suit Injunction Issued in China: Comity, Pragmatism and Rule
of Law, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Sept. 27, 2020), https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/anti-suit-injunction-issued-in-china-comity-pragmatism-and-rule-of-law (“Chinese law does not explicitly
permit the courts to issue anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunctions.”).
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3. other jurisdictions including England, 6 India, 7 France, 8 and Germany 9 all responded to the ASIs of the United States and China
by issuing anti-antisuit injunctions (AASIs, sometimes called
anti-interference injunction 10 or counter-antisuit injunction) 11
which foreclose the obtaining of or enjoin the enforcement of the
foreign ASIs; 12 and
4. anticipating an AASI, the Chinese court issued an anti-anti-antisuit injunction (AAASI) 13 while the German court even issued
an anti-anti-anti-antisuit injunction (AAAASI). 14
The purpose of technical standards is to benefit consumers by facilitating
interoperable technologies to be used worldwide. 15 The FRAND license is a
legal tool designed to achieve that goal by balancing the interests of SEP
owners and standard implementers. 16 However, the increasing number of
conflicting ASIs and AASIs concerning FRAND-encumbered SEPs threatens
to defeat the very purpose of technical standards and FRAND licenses. Resources spent on ASI-related litigation unfortunately create the very inefficiency that the FRAND license seeks to prevent, and the legal costs will eventually be borne by the consumers. 17 Further, conflicting ASIs will cancel out

6.
IPCom GmbH v. Lenovo Tech. Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 (Eng.).
7.
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889 (India).
8.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426 (Fr.).
9.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333/19
(Ger.),
https://www.katheraugenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EN-21-O-933319.pdf.
10.
See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL
89980, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021) (referring to an “anti-anti-suit injunction” as an “antiinterference injunction”).
11.
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 551.
12.
Id.; see also HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 271.
13.
Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
14.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20
(Ger.),
https://www.arnold-ruess.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/InterDigitalvsXiaomiAASI25Feb2021EN.pdf.
15.
See infra text accompanying notes 34–36; see also Jyh-An Lee, Implementing the
FRAND Standard in China, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 37, 42–43 (2016).
16.
See infra text accompanying notes 43–44.
17.
See infra text accompanying note 484.
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the jurisdictions of both opposing courts, leaving no court to effectively resolve FRAND-related issues. 18 Professor Lowenfeld once called forum shopping the “favorite indoor sport of international lawyers.” 19 As the ping-pong
ball of FRAND disputes continues to bounce from one courthouse to another, 20 it is clear that there is no gold medal in sight for this international
game. Therefore, the transnational ping-pong game of FRAND disputes also
eliminates the only value of an ASI, which is to preserve a natural forum that
will best handle the dispute.21 The negative effects of conflicting ASIs are not
restricted to FRAND disputes but can also spill over to international relations.
Many jurisdictions see their courts’ adjudicative jurisdiction as an integral
part of their sovereignty, protected by their respective constitutions. 22 Aggressive ASIs that effectively take away their jurisdictions are therefore received negatively, and can thus adversely affect international relations. 23
In this Article, we aim to address the above problems caused by the use
of ASIs in SEP-related disputes. We argue that the current deadlock stemmed
from three aspects of FRAND disputes: the significant economic interest in
SEPs in each country, the regulatory vacuum in FRAND disputes, and the
unfriendly choice of law rules in FRAND disputes. These three aspects are
interrelated. First, there is no doubt that SEPs are of huge economic significance to every country. Most of the cases referred to above are related to high-

18.
Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-03565, ¶ 27 (“a prohibition imposed
by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings
before a foreign court undermines the latter court’s jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Any
injunction prohibiting a claimant from bringing such an action must be seen as constituting
interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the
system of the [Brussel] Convention.”).
19.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 314, 314 (1997).
20.
See also Peter K. Yu, Jorge L. Contreras & Yu Yang, Transplanting Anti-Suit Injunctions, 71 AM. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3937716 (describing that “[i]n the end, there was no clear court to resolve this dispute [concerning FRAND encumbered SEP-related ASI and subsequent legal proceedings]”).
21.
See Bermann, supra note 2, at 608. Professor Bermann identified three objectives for
ASI: “the prevention of highly inconvenient or vexatious litigation, the vindication of a prior
and independent obligation not to sue, and preservation of the enjoining court’s own jurisdiction
or other local policy-based need to forestall foreign judicial proceedings.” Id. These objectives
ultimately all point to having the single natural forum to resolve the disputes regardless of the
underlying reasons. See also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“If the foreign court reacts with a similar injunction, no party may
be able to obtain any remedy.”).
22.
See infra text accompanying notes 421, 466.
23.
See Bermann, supra note 2, at 604 (“Judicial interference with a foreign country’s
exercise of adjudicatory authority has a potential for embarrassing the political branches of
government and disturbing our relations with that country.”); see also id. at 608 n.75 (discussing
the political spillover effects of Laker Airways to the British and U.S. governments).
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value telecommunication SEPs. 24 They involved most of the key players in
the world’s telecommunications market, including the top five smartphone
manufacturers in the world (Samsung, Apple, Huawei, Xiaomi, and Oppo),
which account for almost two-thirds of global sales in the world. 25 Apple and
Samsung are the largest companies by market cap in the United States and
South Korea, respectively. 26 The latter three manufacturers are all Chinese
companies. 27 Although none of them are state-owned, they are of major economic significance to their respective countries.
Second, despite enormous economic interests involved in standard-setting activities, standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are industrial organizations formed by market players, and no government directly participates in
them. 28 FRAND licenses are essentially self-regulations devoid of governmental control. When FRAND disputes arise, it is natural for the courts in
each country to strive to define a FRAND license in its best interests. 29
Third, the national courts’ tendency to impose their own definitions could
have been harmonized considerably if courts adopted similar choice-of-law
rules. However, in a prior study, the authors found that national courts do the
opposite. 30 They apply vastly different choice-of-law approaches, leading to
different substantive laws being applied to the same FRAND issues. 31 Accordingly, the key battlefield has now been shifted to jurisdiction. Finding a
court with a favorable choice-of-law rule (which in turn applies favorable national law) is imperative to both SEP owners and standard implementers. As
this forum shopping intensifies, concurrent proceedings ensue, leading to increasing ASIs and eventually conflicting ASIs.
We argue that the problem can be better resolved ex ante at SSOs by
inserting an exclusive forum selection clause into their IP policies, instead of
leaving it to national courts ex post. An exclusive forum selection clause will

24.
See infra Table 1 for all relevant ASI cases. The rare ASI litigation that does not
involve telecommunication is Nokia v. Continental. See infra text accompanying notes 403–30
for details of that case.
25.
See Carmen Ang, Top Smartphone Brands, By Global Sales, VISUAL CAPITALIST
(Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/top-smartphone-brands-2020.
26.
See M. Szmigiera, The 100 Largest Companies in the World by Market Capitalization
in 2021, STATISTA (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-inthe-world-by-market-capitalization.
27.
Note even though all three Chinese companies are privately owned, the line between
state-owned-enterprises and privately-owned-enterprises in China is blurred. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103
GEO. L.J. 665, 669 (2015) (“[L]arge firms in China—whether SOEs, POEs, or ambiguous stateprivate blends—survive and prosper precisely because they have fostered connections to state
power and have succeeded in obtaining state-generated rents.”).
28.
See infra text accompanying notes 48–50.
29.
See infra Part III.B.1.
30.
See King Fung Tsang & Jyh-An Lee, Unfriendly Choice of Law in FRAND, 59 VA.
J. INT’L L. 220, 288–91 (2019).
31.
Id.
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substantially reduce the occasions of concurrent jurisdictions. This is because
most national courts respect the exclusive forum selection clause, and will
decline jurisdiction of their own volition, 32 thus eliminating the need for
courts designated by the clause to have exclusive jurisdiction to issue ASIs. 33
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides the background required for the latter discussions by outlining the history, nature, and significance of FRAND licenses and ASIs. Part III addresses the paradox of the
sudden surge of ASIs in FRAND disputes. Part IV analyzes the ASI cases to
date and tracks how the conflicting injunction deadlock has been developed.
Cases from six jurisdictions (the United States, England, China, India,
France, and Germany) are examined. Taking a holistic view, we explore why
different countries have responded differently to the ASIs in FRAND disputes. Part V identifies the issues caused by ASIs in FRAND contexts and
examines existing proposals to resolve SEP-related disputes. We argue that
exclusive jurisdiction is the key to resolving the current deadlock. We also
suggest that conflicting injunctions could be reduced if courts adopted the UK
Supreme Court’s approach in setting the global FRAND rate. Part VI concludes.

II. FRAND AND ASI
A. Standards, SEP, and FRAND
By providing a common design for products or processes to interoperate
with each other, technical standards have become a principal component of
different communications and platform technologies. 34 Standards have
played a crucial role in major sectors of society, ranging from the computer
to telecommunications industries. 35 With the advancement of 5G and the Internet of Things (IoT), technical standards have enabled compatibility not

32.
See infra text accompanying notes 490–514.
33.
Id.
34.
See, e.g., Jason R. Bartlett & Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties:
Can Interpleader Save the Internet of Things?, 36 REV. LITIG. 285, 286 (2017); Thomas F.
Cotter, Is Global FRAND Litigation Spinning Out of Control?, 2021 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1,
2; Lee, supra note 15, at 42–43; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 225–26; Herbert J. Hovenkamp,
FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683, 1683 (2020); John “Jay” Jurata, Jr. & Emily
N. Luken, Glory Days: Do the Anticompetitive Risks of Standards-Essential Patent Pools Outweigh Their Procompetitive Benefits?, 58 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 417, 421 (2021); Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents with FRAND Commitments: Preparing for 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18 COLO. TECH. L.J. 79, 99–100 (2020).
35.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 609 (2019).
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only between smartphones but also between automobiles and various consumer electronics. 36 These technical standards normally contain many SEPs,
which refer to patented technologies that standard implementers can neither
choose alternative technologies to nor design around. 37 A standard implementer is therefore in a disadvantageous position in negotiations with an SEP
holder who can withhold a license until the former agrees to pay an unduly
high royalty rate for the SEP. 38 This disadvantageous position also results
from the fact that a standard implementer normally has invested heavily in
developing products based on a specific standard, and it is prohibitively expensive to opt out of the standard. 39 This is the so-called “hold-up problem”
for the standard implementer. 40
Most standards are developed collaboratively by technology innovators
within SSOs. 41 To address the above hold-up problem, SSOs typically require
their members to license their SEPs under FRAND terms.42 The FRAND license is designed to balance the interests of SEP holders and standard implementers by assuring the former’s fair compensation and the latter’s access to
standard. 43 Without a FRAND declaration and its effective enforcement,

36.
See, e.g., Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 287–89; Cotter, supra note 34, at 2;
Jurata & Luken, supra note 34, at 421; Kung-Chung Liu, Arbitration by SSOs as a Preferred
Solution for Solving the FRAND Licensing of SEPs?, 52 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 673, 673 (2021); Spulber, supra note 34, at 81.
37.
See, e.g., Eli Greenbaum, No Forum to Rule Them All: Comity and Conflict in Transnational FRAND Disputes, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2019); Lee, supra note 15, at 43;
Jyh-An Lee & Sang Jo Jong, Asian Perspectives, in SEPS, SSOS AND FRAND—ASIAN AND
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON FOSTERING INNOVATION IN INTERCONNECTIVITY 127, 127 (KungChung Liu & Reto Hilty eds., 2020); J. Gregory Sidak, Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of
FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014); Tsang
& Lee, supra note 30, at 225–26.
38.
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 15, at 44; Jurata & Luken, supra note 34, at 421.
39.
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 1705; Lee, supra note 15, at 44.
40.
See, e.g., Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 290; Lee & Jong, supra note 37, at
128; Carl Shapiro & Mark A. Lemley, The Role of Antitrust in Preventing Patent Holdup, 168
U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2042–43 (2020); Spulber, supra note 34, at 132–33.
41.
See, e.g., Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 287; Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1136 (2013); Spulber, supra note 34, at 82–83, 86–87.
42.
See, e.g., Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 290; Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate
Setting: A Solution for Standard-Essential Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701, 704 (2019) [hereinafter Contreras, Global Rate Setting]; Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 254;
Cotter, supra note 34, at 2; Garry A. Gabison, Worldwide FRAND Licensing Standard, 8 AM.
U. BUS. L. REV. 139, 141 (2019); Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1089; Jurata & Luken, supra
note 34, at 421; Kirti Gupta, How SSOs Work: Unpacking the Mobile Industry’s 3GPP Standards, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION,
ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 29, 35 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017); Lee & Jong, supra note 37,
at 127–28; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1136–37; Lemley & Simcoe, supra note 35, at
610; Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 40, at 2042–44; Spulber, supra note 34, at 87.
43.
See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 34, at 2; Lee & Jong, supra note 37, at 128; Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1137; Spulber, supra note 34, at 88, 94.
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standard implementers may not legally employ SEPs without being overcharged by the SEP holders. 44 Therefore, the purpose of the FRAND license
is to encourage wide adoption of the underlying standard. 45 However, since
SSOs have never defined what is “fair” or “reasonable,” 46 controversies frequently arise between SEP holders and standard implementers regarding what
constitutes FRAND licensing terms. 47
The FRAND commitment has never been a statutory obligation in the
law. 48 Both standard setting and the FRAND licenses are market-driven private orderings stemming from private parties’ collaborations. 49 Market actors
voluntarily use standards and contracts to achieve their commercial goals and
market efficiency. 50 Although national governments such as China have tried

44.
See, e.g., Gabison, supra note 42, at 141, 143–44; Toshiko Takenaka, Patents for
Sharing, 26 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 93, 110 (2019); Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 227; see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 1703 (“The FRAND process ensures that all participating firms
have access to a common technology so that they can operate on a network where interconnection is essential.”).
45.
See, e.g., Gabison, supra note 42, at 141.
46.
See, e.g., Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 290; Contreras, Global Rate Setting,
supra note 42, at 705; Cotter, supra note 34, at 3; Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 40, at 2044;
see also Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1090 (indicating that FRAND commitment is typically
“terse and vague”).
47.
See, e.g., Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 291–92; Contreras, Global Rate
Setting, supra note 42, at 705–06; Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 254;
Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1090, 1104; Lee, supra note 15, at 45–46; Lee & Jong, supra
note 37, at 127; Tsilikas, supra note 1, at 729.
48.
See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 34, at 101 (“SSO FRAND policies do not suggest government regulation of patent license agreements but rather are intended to foster efficient market
transactions.”).
49.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 703; Hovenkamp, supra
note 34, at 1684–85, 1727; Pierre Larouche, Jorge Padilla & Richard S. Taffet, Settling FRAND
Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration A Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Alternative?, 10 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 585–587 (2014); Lee & Jong, supra note 37, at 128; Toshiko
Takenaka, Inclusive Patents for Open Innovation, 29 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 197 (2021);
Spulber, supra note 34, at 88–89; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 299–300; see also Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., The Internet Adopts Two-Way Radio, 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 147, 219
(2019) (“The most important thing about the regulatory embrace of the Internet’s adoption of
two-way radio is to avoid mandating compliance with particular engineering standards.”); Spulber, supra note 34, at 81–82 (“FRAND commitments create economic benefits because they
rely on private contract negotiation.”). But see Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government
Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (arguing that SSOs may impose higher transaction costs
than government prescription of standards).
50.
Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 299–300; Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 572 (2015).

314

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 28:305

to enact or promote their preferred technical standards for global communications technologies, 51 such endeavors have never led to any successful result. 52
SEP-related litigations are both legally and technically complicated. We
have classified the main legal issues surrounding FRAND-encumbered SEPs
into three categories: (1) enforceability issues, (2) licensing term issues, and
(3) negotiation issues, each of which could lead to complex issues in patent
law, contract law, and competition law respectively.53 Enforceability issues
concern the appropriate legal basis for the implementer to hold SEP holders
liable for licensing their SEPs under FRAND terms. 54 Licensing term issues
mainly cover issues relevant to the determination of FRAND terms and rates,
which include, but are not limited to, determining a particular royalty rate and
determining a proper way to calculate the FRAND rate. 55 Negotiation issues
refer to whether SEP holders and standard implementers are obliged to negotiate the FRAND rate in good faith. 56
Since standards are used internationally, and the markets for products
built upon standards are global in nature, most SSOs aim to create worldwide
standards under a FRAND license. 57 Therefore, most FRAND licenses are
designed to be granted globally rather than in one single jurisdiction. 58 The
51.
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 15, at 46–47; D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND
(and Industry Policy) in China, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 306, 310–11 (Jorge L.
Contreras ed., 2017).
52.
See, e.g., Yu, Contreras & Yang, supra note 20 (manuscript at 24–25).
53.
See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1086–87; Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 40,
at 2021–24; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 228–36; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at
1685 (pointing out government’s role associated with FRAND is the “enforcement of contract,
intellectual property, or antitrust law”).
54.
See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Enforcing FRAND and Other SDO Licensing Commitments, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 178 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017); Tsang & Lee,
supra note 30, at 230–32; Jurata & Luken, supra note 34, at 436–38.
55.
See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1090–91; Jurata & Luken, supra note 34, at
432; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 232–33.
56.
Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 234–36.
57.
See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott, US Government Antitrust Intervention in Standard-Setting
Activities and the Competitive Process, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 225, 232 (2016); Tsang
& Lee, supra note 30, at 237–38; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool
Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 47 (2013) (“Most of
the thousands of technical standards currently deployed throughout the world were developed
collaboratively by market participants in voluntary standard-development organizations.”);
Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless Industry, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 865, 866 (2015) (“A broad variety of firms collaborate to develop common
technology standards . . . .”); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards,
Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 237 (2014) (stating that SSOs
are voluntary collectives representing private companies).
58.
See, e.g., Gabison, supra note 42, at 165–66; Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1086–
87; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 237; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d
872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he face of the [FRAND commitment] contract makes clear that it
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worldwide nature of FRAND licenses has been recognized by courts in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States. 59 Since standards
and FRAND licenses are global in nature, disputes over FRAND-encumbered
SEPs are usually transnational. 60 Moreover, parties in FRAND disputes are
normally multinational enterprises with business operations in different countries. 61 However, patents are granted by nation states as part of their sovereignty. 62 When disputes over the same FRAND-encumbered SEPs occur in
different countries, their respective courts need to decide these cases separately. 63 Consequently, the tension between the global nature of FRAND licenses and the territorial characteristics of patents has created another layer
of complexity in disputes over FRAND-encumbered SEPs.

B. ASIs and Their Anti-Comity Nature
1. ASIs
Once an ASI is granted, the foreign court can no longer adjudicate the
case. It is therefore often called a “weapon” in the arsenal of a common law
court in private international law. 64 However, whether in the United States or
England, 65 an ASI is rarely supposed to be granted 66 due to its impact on the
alternative forum even though an ASI is in theory an in personam remedy
issued against the litigant. 67 It is even rarer for there to be conflicting ASIs
when the courts of more than one country grant ASIs in the same case. The
most notable case is Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways

encompasses not just U.S. patents, but all of Motorola’s standard-essential patents worldwide.”).
59.
See, e.g., Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344
[129] (Eng.); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d at 875, 883–85.
60.
See, e.g., Bonadio & McDonagh, supra note 1, at 149; Greenbaum, supra note 37, at
1086–87, 1108; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 239–40.
61.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 723; Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 255; Liu, supra note 36, at 675.
62.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 722–23; Contreras, New
Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 255; Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 238–39.
63.
See, e.g., Gabison, supra note 42, at 141; Tsilikas, supra note 1, at 729.
64.
See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 2, at 601, 608.
65.
Courts in other common law jurisdictions also possess the power to grant ASI, but
rarely exercised such power. See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 272.
66.
Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Comity
dictates that foreign antisuit injunctions be issued sparingly and only in the rarest of cases.”).
67.
See Trevor C. Hartley, Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions in International
Litigation, 35 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 487, 506 (1987) (“In theory, an antisuit injunction does not
interfere with the foreign court because it operates in personam: it is an order addressed to the
litigant, not to the court. . . . [However], a court is in reality deciding whether the foreign court
will hear the case.”).
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(Laker Airways), explained below, where both the English and U.S. courts
issued ASIs in a litigation regarding the antitrust disputes in the early 1980s.68
ASIs can save litigation costs for parties and prevent inconsistent court
decisions across jurisdictions. 69 This is because it can protect the jurisdiction
of the domestic court by enjoining the party from initiating or continuing the
foreign proceedings. 70 From the litigant’s perspective, ASIs can be a tool to
prevent the opposing party from forum shopping. However, it is also dangerous. It can easily sour an international relationship, as no court wants to have
its jurisdiction stripped by the court of another country. 71 It could also lead to
retaliation, such as AASIs, 72 a court injunction ordering the party that has
filed for an ASI in a foreign jurisdiction to withdraw that filing. 73 Thus, to
protect comity, in jurisdictions that allow courts to issue ASIs, courts invariably refer to the importance of utilizing the remedy with care in every case.74

68.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983),
aff’d, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
see HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 272 (“This appears to be the only case in which conflicting
antisuit injunctions have been granted by the courts of different countries.”). Note, however,
there is at least one more such litigation. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899
(Tex. App. 1991) (issuing an AASI against the ASI issued by a Canadian court).
69.
See, e.g., Contreras & Eixenberger, supra note 1, at 451, 458; Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 265; Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018); see also TCL
Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVSAN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *19 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (granting an ASI based
on both parties’ “desire that this action should result in a ‘global resolution’ of the SEP patent
licensing and damages claims”).
70.
See Bermann, supra note 2, at 589–90.
71.
See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 936.
72.
Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J., dissenting)
(“Unless we proceed in each instance with respect for the independent jurisdiction of a sovereign nation’s courts, we risk provoking retaliation in turn, with detrimental consequences that
may reverberate far beyond the particular dispute and its private litigants. Amicable relations
among sovereign nations and their judicial systems depend on our recognition, as federal courts,
that we share the international arena with co-equal judicial bodies, and that we therefore act to
deprive a foreign court of jurisdiction only in the most extreme circumstances.”).
73.
Tsilikas, supra note 1, at 733.
74.
For U.S. cases, see, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 (“A . . . reason cautioning
against exercise of the power is avoiding the impedance of the foreign jurisdiction. Injunctions
operates only on the parties within the personal jurisdiction of the courts. However, they effectively restrict the foreign court’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction.”). For English cases, see,
e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Highland Crusader Offshore Partners L.P. [2009] EWCA (Civ) 725
[50] (Eng.) (“An anti-suit injunction always requires caution because by definition it involves
interference with the process or potential process of a foreign court.”).
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2. Anti-Comity Nature
Comity in private international law can be traced back to Dutch scholar
Ulrich Huber. 75 In essence, whether a country is applying foreign law, 76 assuming jurisdiction over foreign nationals, 77 or giving effect to foreign judgments, 78 decisions are based on comity. While the term is elusive and often
criticized, 79 it generally refers to a voluntary concession made by a country’s
court. 80 The U.S. Supreme Court held in Hilton v. Guyot that there is never
an obligation to grant such concessions to a foreign court. 81 According to Huber, the underlying reason for a domestic court to make concessions to its
territorial sovereignty is to facilitate international trade:
Although the laws of one nation can have no force directly with another, yet nothing could be more inconvenient to commerce and to
international usage than that transactions valid by the law of one
place should be rendered of no effect elsewhere on account of a difference in the law. And that is the reason for the third maxim concerning which hitherto no doubt appears to have been entertained. 82
Thus, the original concept of comity is a voluntary tradeoff of territoriality by
a country to gain trade benefits that are in its national interest. 83 The goal is to
75.
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 375 (1918–
1919) (“[Huber’s De Conflictu Legum] has had a greater influence upon the development of
the Conflict of Laws in England and the United States than any other work. No other foreign
work has been so frequently cited. Story himself relied upon Huber more than upon any of the
other foreign jurists.”).
76.
See id. at 403 (“Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within
the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause prejudice to
the power or rights of such government or of its subjects.”).
77.
See James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction
in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 73, 80 (1990) (arguing that Huber’s maxims extend to jurisdiction).
78.
See Lorenzen, supra note 75, at 407–08.
79.
See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1982) (stating that
international comity is “an amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines
of politics, courtesy, and good faith”); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937 (calling comity a “complex
and elusive” concept).
80.
See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937 (defining the term as “the degree of deference
that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the
forum”).
81.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at
937 (“Hilton v. Guyot, recognizes that comity never obligates a national forum to ignore ‘the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’”)
82.
See Lorenzen, supra note 75, at 403.
83.
Canadian Supreme Court called it a balancing exercise. See Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta
Golf Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 27 (Can.) (“Comity is a balancing exercise. The relevant
considerations are respect for a nation’s acts, international duty, convenience and protection of
a nation’s citizens. Where equitable orders are concerned, courts must take care not to emphasize the factor of respect for a nation’s acts to the point of imbalance. An equitable order triggers
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achieve mutual benefits: “[t]he interests of both forums are advanced—the foreign court because its laws and policies have been vindicated; the domestic
country because international cooperation and ties have been strengthened. The
rule of law is also encouraged, which benefits all nations.” 84
However, ASIs are not based on this idea of comity. Where there are
concurrent jurisdictions, the domestic court involuntarily deprives the foreign
court of its jurisdiction through an ASI. The justification for an ASI instead
comes from territoriality. In many occasions, the ASI is granted against foreign proceedings to protect the local proceedings. 85 For example, after the
court has handed down a judgment against the defendant, a common law court
would consider issuing an ASI against a defendant who tries to relitigate the
same case in a foreign court. 86 The injunction, therefore, protects the integrity
of local proceedings, even at the expense of intruding on a foreign courts’
jurisdiction. While common law courts still include “comity” as an element
when considering whether to issue an ASI, 87 it is not the same as Huber’s
comity. Instead of a voluntary concession based on mutual benefits, it is a
unilateral calculation by the ASI rendering court on whether the intrusion to
a foreign court’s jurisdiction is “tolerable.” 88 In other words, comity is no
longer the reason to make concessions to foreign jurisdiction but becomes a
self-imposed limitation not to intrude the foreign jurisdiction excessively.
If the local court does not apply this alternative concept of “comity”
properly, the ASI can seriously disrupt the traditional concept of comity on
all fronts, but most clearly disrupting jurisdiction. Instead of letting foreign

considerations of both convenience for the enforcing state and protection of its judicial system.”).
84.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.
85.
See Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC)
at 892–93 (appeal taken from Brunei) (“In [many] cases, it may be said that the purpose of the
injunction is to protect the jurisdiction of the English court.”); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927
(“Courts have a duty to protect their legitimately conferred jurisdiction to the extent necessary
to provide full justice to litigants. Thus, when the action of a litigant in another forum threatens
to paralyze the jurisdiction of the court, the court may consider the effectiveness and propriety
of issuing an injunction against the litigant’s participation in the foreign proceedings.”).
86.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 551.
87.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 886–89 (9th Cir. 2012).
88.
Id. at 881; Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 939 (“Comity ordinarily requires that courts
of a separate sovereign not interfere with concurrent proceedings based on the same transitory
claim, at least until a judgment is reached in one action, allowing res judicata to be pled in
defense. The appeal to the recognition of comity by the American court in order to permit the
critical issues to be adjudicated in England, which is the plea made by appellants here, thus
comes based on a very strange predicate. Since the action seeking to determine Laker’s right to
recover for anticompetitive injuries was first instituted in the United States, the initial opportunity to exercise comity, if this were called for, was put to the United Kingdom courts. No
recognition or acceptance of comity was made in those courts. The appellants’ claims of comity
now asserted in United States courts come burdened with the failure of the British to recognize
comity.”).
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courts concede the case by lis penden or forum non conveniens, an ASI simply
takes away the foreign courts’ jurisdiction.
This also applies to the enforcement of foreign judgment. Under normal
enforcement rules, a court of Country A may decide only whether to give
effect to the foreign judgment of Country B in Country A’s territory. Even if
it is to deny the enforcement of Country B’s judgment, it is a matter within
Country A’s sovereignty and will not infringe on Country B’s sovereignty.
However, through an ASI, the court of Country A may restrain the judgment
creditor from enforcing Country B’s judgment in the territory of Country B
and/or a third country. Obviously, this would be a serious infringement of
Country B’s sovereignty, as its judgment will be denied effect in its own territory. This injunction is sometimes called an anti-enforcement injunction. 89
Regarding choice of law, although the ASI does not impose the local rule
on the foreign court, this can be achieved indirectly by taking away the jurisdiction of the foreign court, thereby denying its opportunity to apply a choiceof-law analysis. 90 Comparatively, extraterritorial application of local law
does not have the same level of intrusion, as foreign courts can still proceed
with their own choice-of-law analysis. 91
However, this is not to say that the ASI does not have any positive value.
As a means of self-defense, when used properly, it can prevent unjustified
encroachment by the foreign court of the local jurisdiction. 92 AASIs can be
seen as the best example of such self-defense. Instead of depriving a foreign
court of its jurisdiction in adjudicating the dispute, an AASI simply nullifies
the foreign court’s ASI. 93 The challenge, however, is how to draw the line in
concurrent jurisdictions when more than one national court can claim legitimate jurisdiction over the same matter. One court can see its initial ASI as a
self-defense measure against a frivolous foreign proceeding, while the court
presiding over that foreign proceeding can see the ASI as an unjustified encroachment of its jurisdiction and issue the AASI in return.

89.
SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd. [2020] EWCA (Civ) 599 [92] (Eng.).
90.
The impact of jurisdiction goes beyond the choice of substantive law as it also dictates the application of the procedural law. See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 5–8.
91.
This is illustrated by Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 930 (explaining that even if the U.S.
antitrust law applied extraterritorially, the English court can still apply its own law, including
its choice of law rules, in the English proceedings).
92.
See id. at 936 (“Our courts are not required to stand by while Britain attempts to close
a courthouse door that Congress, under its territorial jurisdiction, has opened to foreign corporations. Under the nationality base of jurisdiction, Britain can punish its corporations for walking through that courthouse door, but it cannot close the American door. Thus, although British
courts can sanction their citizens for resorting to United States antitrust remedies, United States
courts are not required to cut off the availability of the remedy.”).
93.
See id. at 938 (stating that the U.S. court’s AASI was “purely defensive—it seeks
only to preserve the district court’s ability to arrive at a final judgment adjudicating Laker’s
claims under United States law. This judgment would neither make any statement nor imply
any views about the wisdom of British antitrust policy.”).
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This challenge is best illustrated by the litigation involving Laker Airways. 94 Laker Airways was a pioneer in economic airlines that started operations in late 1970s. 95 Despite some successes in operating the trans-Atlantic
flights, it went bankrupt after some alleged predatory pricing tactics were
adopted by several competing airlines, including two British airlines (British
Airways and British Caledonian Airways). 96 Laker Airways then sued these
airlines in the United States for violation of U.S. antitrust law.97 The airlines
then filed a declaration of non-liability in England.98 In addition, they also
applied for an ASI and AASI in England against Laker Airways, barring it
from pursuing the U.S. antitrust suit and any potential countering ASI against
the English proceedings. 99 The injunction conflict ensued when the U.S. court
issued an AASI against the defendant airlines to preserve the U.S. proceedings. 100 The court’s AASI was upheld on appeal. Meanwhile, the English ASI
was eventually rescinded by the House of Lords, thus ending injunction conflicts. 101
The initial ASI by the English court can be seen as a response to the perceived exorbitant jurisdiction of the extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust law. 102
Hence, the English court’s action was in self-defense to protect its jurisdiction. However, the U.S. court viewed the English ASI as an encroachment of
U.S. jurisdiction granted by the Congress.103 From the U.S. perspective, it
was also defending its own jurisdiction. The conflicting injunctions in Laker
Airways, therefore, reflected a much deeper difference in national policies
and interests between the two countries. 104 These same differences in national

94.
Id. at 909.
95.
Id. at 916.
96.
Id. at 917.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 918.
99.
British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd. [1984] QB 142 (Eng.).
100.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 915–16.
101.
British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd. [1985] AC 58 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
102.
British Airways Board [1984] QB 142 at 158–59 (“Suppose, for example, that two
United Kingdom companies, neither of which traded in or to America, openly made a price
agreement lawful in this country but that the purchasers of their goods in this country exported
them to the United States. Suppose further that some time later both United Kingdom companies
appointed agents in the United States and thus enabled United States proceedings to be served
upon them and that a United Kingdom company, with a place of business in the United States
who had purchased the goods, launched an anti-trust action. In such circumstances it appears to
me that justice might well demand that the plaintiff be prevented from pursuing an action in
respect of acts performed wholly in this country and wholly lawful here even though, if so
prevented, the plaintiff would be left without a remedy. To allow such an action to proceed at
the suit of a United Kingdom company would involve exposing United Kingdom defendants to
an action based on what is regarded here as an exorbitant assertion of extra-territoriality.”).
103.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 935–36.
104.
See Aryeh S. Friedman, Laker Airways: The Dilemma of Concurrent Jurisdiction and
Conflicting National Policies, 11 BROOK. J. INT’L. 181 (1985).
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interests are also reflected in the conflicting injunctions in FRAND litigations, which will be discussed in the following part.

III. THE SUDDEN SURGE OF SEP-RELATED ASIS
A. The Surge of SEP-Related ASIs
ASIs and AASIs have become increasingly common in transnational
FRAND litigations. Table 1 provides an overview of the global surge of ASIs.
Four observations are noteworthy. First, despite the encroachment of foreign
courts’ jurisdiction highlighted in Part II.B, the total number of ASI litigations of the six surveyed countries is significant, amounting to twenty-two
ASIs and AASIs. Second, although U.S. courts have started to issue ASIs
since 2012, most countries have only started to issue ASIs or AASIs since
2019, showing a clear surge. Third, most of the filings of ASIs or AASIs in
FRAND cases resulted in an ASI or AASI being issued. There were only four
unsuccessful cases. This is contrary to the conventional belief that courts will
consider an ASI application with care and only issue an ASI in the most extreme circumstances. 105 Fourth, AASIs are responses to ASIs, since many of
the ASIs and AASIs stem from the same litigations. As will be seen in Part
III, these conflicting injunction cases are particularly sophisticated.

105.
The authors do not intend to draw any empirical findings out of the limited sample
size. We just highlight a general observation.
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TABLE 1 THE SURGE IN ASI LITIGATIONS WORLDWIDE
No. of ASI
Cases 106

No. of AASI
Cases 107

8 108

No. of Failed Year of First ASI/
ASI/AASI Cases
AASI Issued

1 109

4 110

2012

111

0

0

2020

Germany

0

3

112

0

2019

France

0

2

113

0

2019

United States
China

5

106.
This table counts the number of cases instead of litigations. For example, in the litigation between Microsoft and Motorola, the first instance decision in Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012) was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). Both cases are counted.
107.
Like ASI, if an AASI litigation involves more than one case, all involved cases will
be counted separately.
108.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d,
696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015);
Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017); Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018); Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14cv-4988, 2015 WL 3498634 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015); Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei
Device Co., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018); Cont’l
Auto. Sys. v. Avanci, LLC, No. 19-CV-02520-LHK, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214608 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 11, 2019).
109.
Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL 89980
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
110.
Apple, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835; Vringo, 2015 WL 3498634; Optis Wireless,
2018 WL 476054; Cont’l Auto. Sys., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214608.
111.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Kang Wensen Wuxian Xuke Youxian Gongsi (ॾ
Ѫᢰᵟᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ) [Huawei Tech. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L.], 2019 Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 732, 733, 734 (Sup. People's Ct. Aug.
28, 2020) (China); Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan
Interm. People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China); Xiaomi Tongxun Jishu Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi
Gongsi (ሿ㊣䙊䇟ᢰᵟޜਨ䇹Ӕӂᮠᆇޜਨ) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital
Holdings, Inc.], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 431 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 23, 2020)
(China); OPPO Guangdong Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi Su Xiapu Zhushi Huishe (OPPO
ᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹༿ᲞṚᔿՊ⽮) [OPPO Guangdong Mobile Telecomms. Co. v.
Sharp Corp.], Yue 03 Min Chu No. 689 (Shenzhen Interm. People’s Ct. Oct. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Oppo] (China); Zhongxing Tongxun Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Kang Wensen Wuxian
Xuke Youxian Gongsi (ѝޤ䙊䇟㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ) [ZTE Corp. v.
Conversant Wireless Licensing Co.], Yue 03 Min Chu No. 335 (Shenzhen Interm. People’s Ct.
Sept. 28, 2020) (China).
112.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333/19
(Ger.); Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich] Dec.
12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19 (Ger.); Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25,
2021, 7 O 14276/20 (Ger.).
113.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426 (Fr.).

May 2022]
England
India
Total

The Ping-Pong Olympics of Antisuit Injunction
1 114

1 115

117

0

14

1

323

0 116

2019

118

0

2021

8

4

—

SEP-related ASIs, in a broader sense, may be growing even faster. Competition authorities may adopt measures with goals similar to that of an ASI.
In 2013, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission found that Google and Motorola
unlawfully sought injunctions against the infringement of FRANDencumbered SEPs. 119 The parties eventually reached an agreement limiting
the right of Google and Motorola to seek such injunctions. 120 This agreement
applied to all actions for an injunction in any jurisdiction. 121

B. Why the Surge?
The surge of ASIs is puzzling. A FRAND dispute can involve contract,
patent, and competition law issues. 122 Looking at the FRAND dispute as a
patent issue, ASIs are most intrusive to a foreign country’s jurisdiction because patent cases, particularly those concerning patent validity, are normally
adjudicated by courts in the specific jurisdiction in which the subject patent
is granted. 123 Similarly, a country’s competition law reflects its economic policy, and competition authorities’ law enforcement actions are normally based
114.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2831 (Eng.).
115.
IPCom GmbH & Co. KG v. Lenovo Tech. (UK) Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030
(Eng.).
116.
The only ASI application on FRAND-encumbered SEPs in English court was compromised before the court could hand down a decision. The judge was in the opinion that the
ASI would have been granted had the case been fought to the conclusion. See Unwired Planet
[2017] EWHC (Pat) 2831 [13].
117.
Although IDC applied for ASI as well as AASI initially in InterDigital Tech. Corp.
v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889 (India), it did not pursue the ASI application in the end.
118.
Id.
119.
Complaint at 25, Motorola Mobility LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 1210120, Docket No.
C-4410 (July 23, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07
/130724googlemotorolacmpt.pdf.
120.
Decision and Order, Motorola Mobility LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 1210120, Docket
No. C-4410 (July 24, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07
/130724googlemotorolado.pdf.
121.
Id. at 4.
122.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–56.
123.
See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A] patent right
. . . only arises from the legal right granted and recognized by the sovereign within whose territory the right is located. It would be incongruent to allow the sovereign power of one to be
infringed or limited by another sovereign’s extension of its jurisdiction.”); Cotter, supra note
34, at 3–4 (“[C]ourts often have been reluctant to adjudicate foreign patent rights, partly out of
concern that doing so might undermine the principle of comity—that is, of the respect due to
the courts and other institutions of foreign nations.”); Marketa Trimble, GAT, Solvay, and the
Centralization of Patent Litigation in Europe, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 515, 518 (2012) (describing that in Europe, “the courts and administrative bodies of the country in which a patent
was granted may decide the validity of the patent”).
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on the country’s sovereignty. 124 Each country has its own interest in scrutinizing the potential anti-competitive effects within its border. 125 Therefore,
any intervention in foreign patent and competition law issues may be controversial. 126 Intervention in the form of ASIs intrudes the territoriality of another country, perhaps in more ways than other aspects of private international law.
In addition, following Laker Airways and Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb in
early 1990s, 127 there had not been conflicting injunctions until 2019. 128 Professor Hartley observed that since Laker Airways, English and U.S. courts
have tried to prevent such conflicting injunctions. 129 He also thought that the
conflicting injunctions were “only ever likely to occur in cases involving
these two countries.” 130 Although detailed discussion of the key precedents
from each of the jurisdictions is necessary to fully analyze the surge, 131 the
SEP-related ASI debacle has been attributed to three general reasons: (1) the
national interests involved in ASIs, (2) the international legal vacuum of
FRAND licenses, and (3) the choice of law induced forum shopping. These
reasons were also present in Laker Airways, though FRAND disputes involve
far more multinational corporations and jurisdictions.

1. National Interest in FRAND-encumbered SEPs
Significant economic interests are at stake when it comes to FRAND disputes due to its dictation of how SEP should be priced and licensed. An SEP
owner’s financial prospects depend on how FRAND issues are to be decided.
Ericsson, an SEP owner who has been involved in numerous ASI litigations,
illustrated the financial impacts from FRAND litigation. After filing its
FRAND suit against Samsung, Ericsson announced that its operating income
in the first quarter of 2021 would decrease by SEK 1–1.5 billion (approximately USD 118–177 million) due to delayed royalty income and litigation
costs. 132 After the case was subsequently settled, Ericsson announced that its

124.
See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145835, at *56–57 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017).
125.
See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1127; see also Gabison, supra note 42, at 153
(introducing the viewpoint in Apple v. Qualcomm that “countries had their own interest enforcing their antitrust laws”); Liu, supra note 36, at 676 (indicating the challenge to coordinate
competition authorities in different countries to cope with FRAND-related issues).
126.
See also Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1104 (showing that U.S. courts “have generally shied away from adjudicating disputes concerning foreign patents”).
127.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App. 1991).
128.
See supra Table 1.
129.
See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 272.
130.
Id.
131.
See infra Part IV.
132.
See Ericsson Update: IPR License Renewals and Risk of Financial Impact, ERICSSON
(Dec. 11, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2020/12/ericssonupdate-ipr-license-renewals-and-risk-of-financial-impact.
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IP licensing revenues were expected to reach SEK 2–2.5 billion in the second
quarter due to the new licensing deal with Samsung. 133 The same is also true
for the standard implementers. 134 Considering that most SEP owners and implementers are technological giants in their respective countries, 135 success in
FRAND litigations will often impact the economic prosperity of many countries.
Furthermore, the significance of FRAND-encumbered SEPs even rises
to the level of strategic importance. This can be illustrated by the cases of the
United States and China, the two global superpowers. Among others, standards for 5G and IoT are particularly relevant to national security. 136 Both the
Chinese and the U.S. government have declared their determination to lead
5G development and emphasized its important implications for cybersecurity
and national security. 137 For the United States, commentators have discussed
how FRAND-encumbered SEPs and how its underlying technologies impacted U.S. national security:
Critical innovation in emerging technologies, such as 5G communications, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, gene-based
therapies, vaccine development, and so many more, is vitally important to the national security of the United States. The betterment
of our collective experience depends on continued advance in these
technologies. Those future advances in turn require broad technological access and proper protections and remuneration to innovators so
that transformative companies and their ground-breaking scientists
and inventors will have the resource and incentives to continue on
their path of innovation. . . . [FRAND litigation] raises serious concerns about how critical innovation will be valued in the marketplace
and in courts. 138

133.
See Ericsson and Samsung Sign Global Patent License Agreement, ERICSSON (May
7, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2021/5/ericsson-and-samsungsign-global-patent-license-agreement.
134.
Failing to reach license agreement with SEP owners could mean being shut out from
markets. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
135.
See Ang, supra note 25.
136.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING
THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) 7–9 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL_v2-dg11.pdf.
137.
See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE 5G OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 4–7 (2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads
/2020/03/National-Strategy-5G-Final.pdf; MINISTRY OF INDUS. & INFO. TECH. IN CHINA,
NOTICE CONCERNING PROMOTING THE ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF 5G (ᐕъ઼ؑॆ
䜘ޣҾ᧘ࣘ5GᘛਁኅⲴ䙊⸕) (2020), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-03/25
/content_5495201.htm.
138.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Thom Tillis et al. in Support of Appellees at 2–3,
Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL 89980 (E.D. Tex. Jan.
11, 2021) (No. 21-1565) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Thom Tillis et al.].
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Similarly, technological innovation is one of the top items of the Chinese
national agenda. 139 Chinese dominance in the 5G standard setting and relevant SEPs has drawn particular national security concerns in the United
States. 140 The U.S. government has explicitly indicated that given the importance of 5G standards in the critical infrastructure, Chinese companies’
increasing control over these standards and associated SEPs have made the
U.S. critical infrastructure more vulnerable. 141 The national interests of both
China and the United States concerning technical standards can also be observed through their recent trade war. The United States has scrutinized
China’s aggressive development strategies in certain areas, many of which
are built upon technical standards. These areas include, but are not limited to,
advanced information technology, robotics, automated machine tools, and advanced medical devices. 142 Therefore, access to standards and subsequent
costs concern not only competition between private entities, but, more importantly, are also closely related to the technological and economic competition between these two global superpowers.143
Regarding FRAND litigation and subsequent ASIs, some commentators
argue that “China has strong national interests in the outcomes of such disputes, since those disputes can affect how much companies with close state
ties, like Huawei, must pay for a license to implement SEPs in their own telecommunications systems and mobile devices.” 144 The U.S. government even
suggested that the proliferation of ASIs in China was because Chinese courts
“‘serv[e]’ the ‘overall work’ of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese
state.” 145 Considering the significant national interests associated with standard setting and SEPs, the ASI and AASI in FRAND litigation have become

139.
See Brief of 13 Law, Business, and Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellee at 8–9, Ericsson Inc., 2021 WL 89980 (No. 21-1565) [hereinafter Brief of
13 Professors].
140.
Eli Greenbaum, 5G, Standard-Setting, and National Security, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
(July 3, 2018), https://harvardnsj.org/2018/07/5g-standard-setting-and-national-security.
141.
Id.; see also NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE
5G IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 27 (2021), https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications
/2021-1-12_115445_national_strategy_to_secure_5g_implementation_plan_and_annexes_a_
f_final.pdf (“The Department of State leads department and agency efforts to communicate the
range and breadth of risks and threats posed by untrusted vendors [of 5G products] that are
subject to unchecked control or influence by authoritarian governments, including the People’s
Republic of China (PRC).”).
142.
See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the U.S.-China Trade War, 43
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 147, 176–77 (2020).
143.
Cf. id. at 175 (introducing the viewpoint that “the very nature of the trade war between the two powers is the competition for technological leadership”).
144.
Brief of 13 Professors, supra note 139, at 9.
145.
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2021 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 47–48 (2021),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Special%20301%20Report%20(final).pdf.
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effective instruments for countries to maintain and reinforce their technological, economic, and political advantages in the international political economy.
The national interest on FRAND disputes today is comparable to the national interest in aviation and antitrust back in the early 1980s, when England
and the United States were butting heads in the injunction conflicts in Laker
Airway. “National air carriers are viewed by their governments as more than
merely instruments of transportation—they are also ‘instruments of economic
policy, domestic and foreign national policy, national defense and in some
instances espionage.’” 146 In addition, it goes beyond the economic interest of
aviation itself to “the larger debate over what constitutes appropriate economic regulatory policy in general, as well as the proper reach of national
economic regulatory law.” 147 For the United States, predatory pricing by British airlines, despite occurring mainly in England, affected the U.S. market
enough to justify the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. 148 This
clashed with the regulatory policy of England, which also happened to own
British Airways. The predatory pricing was legal in England, 149 and the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has long been an objection of
England, which resulted in the parliament passing a defensive statute, the
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980. 150 At the time of the lawsuit, the
British government was in the midst of its plan to sell the majority stake of
the airline. 151 Given the similar modern national interests in the subject matter, it is therefore not surprising that the injunction conflicts return after almost four decades.

2. International Legal Vacuum
With FRAND-encumbered SEPs being of high national interest, the lack
of international regulation creates a scramble of powers over FRAND disputes, which contributed to the recent surge in ASIs. As standards and
FRAND licenses are created by SSOs composed of private parties, 152 there is
no international treaty that regulates FRAND disputes. With FRAND terms
not defined by SSOs, 153 this creates a legal vacuum to be filled by national
courts. 154 This is comparable to the context of Laker Airways.

146.
Friedman, supra note 104, at 219.
147.
Id. at 223.
148.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
149.
See Friedman, supra note 104, at 223.
150.
Id.
151.
Id. at 206.
152.
See supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
153.
See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 34, at 290–91.
154.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2012); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [6] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Although the pricing of cross-Atlantic flights was regulated by a bilateral
treaty between England and the United States, antitrust matters are not similarly regulated internationally. For countries facing this international vacuum
of antitrust, one approach is to apply its law extraterritorially, as the United
States does. 155 Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, resist such extraterritoriality. 156 Faced with this political divergence in the regulatory approaches, national courts tend to side with the approach and interests of their
respective governments. Judge Wilkey succinctly summarized this in Laker
Airway:
Despite the real obligations of courts to apply international law and
foster comity, domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals. Domestic courts are created by national constitutions
and statutes to enforce primarily national laws. The courts of most
developed countries follow international law only to the extent it is
not overridden by national law. Thus, courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. When there is
any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over foreign interests. 157
Given that the aim of FRAND licenses is to license the same technology
internationally, 158 it would certainly be more efficient to resolve the licensing
issue in the same court, instead of risking inconsistent judgments across different countries. In Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (Unwired v. Huawei), the English court declared such “country
by country licensing as madness.” 159 This explains why courts in certain jurisdictions recently seized the opportunity to decide global royalty rates for
the exploitation of FRAND-encumbered SEPs beyond their jurisdictions. 160
However, courts around the world have adopted different approaches to
the calculation of FRAND royalty rates involving jurisdiction-specific economic, political, and social elements. 161 Commentators have observed that
countries with more implementers as their main companies may set lower
FRAND rates, and vice versa. 162 The national interests therefore drive certain
national courts to set global rates. This means that a decisive factor in

155.
See Friedman, supra note 104, at 184.
156.
Id.
157.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
158.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–60.
159.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [543]
(Eng.).
160.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 723–24; Contreras, New
Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 255, 259–64, 279; Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1087–90.
161.
Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1100–01.
162.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Thom Tillis et al., supra note 138, at 14.
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FRAND litigation is which national law is to be applied, which in turn, depends on the choice of law rules applied by the court.
Different courts apply different choice-of-law approaches, particularly
on characterization, in FRAND matters. 163 This led to inconsistent decisions
even when the courts decided on the same FRAND disputes. 164 With the
choice of law approach of a court dictated by lex fori, the law of the forum,
this gives litigants the motivation to shop for a favorable forum. When both
sides do the same, concurrent litigations ensue, setting the stage for the injunction conflicts.
Choice of law was at the center stage of the Laker Airways dispute as
well. The specific choice of law issue is different, focusing on the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. 165 The forum shopping, however, is
the same. The antitrust suit can only be litigated in U.S. courts; thus, if the
U.S. litigation was barred by the English ASI, the plaintiff would lose. 166
In summary, forum shopping and corresponding ASIs will threaten comity and harm the goal of fostering international compatibility via worldwide
standards under a global FRAND license. 167 The surge of SEP-related ASIs
is not a pure coincidence but rather an accumulation of vast national interests
present in a field with no international regulatory governance that could, in
turn, be shaped by national choice of law rules. However, while this provides
the general explanation on the surge in ASIs, it cannot explain the different
ASI approaches adopted by different courts. Conflicts in ASIs have much to
do with the different countries’ legal traditions of ASIs, and their respective
national interests in FRAND-encumbered SEPs, as seen in the next section.

IV. CONFLICTING ASIS
In analyzing the conflicting ASIs, it may be appropriate to divide the six
jurisdictions into two groups: the aggressor group, including the United States
and China, and the defender group, including England, India, France, and
Germany. As will be seen in the following analysis, each of these jurisdictions
has invented new ways to empower their respective injunctions in FRAND
litigations.

A. United States
We began the discussion of developing conflicting injunctions with the
United States. Although ASIs had a long history in England, 168 the United
163.
See Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 288–91, 293–96.
164.
Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1099.
165.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922–26 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
166.
See Hartley, supra note 67, at 493–94.
167.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
168.
See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 412–24.
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States certainly carried it to a new level. Despite the constant warning that
ASIs could only be used sparingly and be granted in the rarest cases, 169 the
reality is that U.S. courts have been quite willing to grant the injunction both
domestically (in interstate cases) and internationally. 170 It is, therefore, not
surprising that the first FRAND-related ASI, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 171 came from a U.S. court. Before discussing this case, however, it must
be noted that there is no uniform test for granting an ASI in the United States,
whether local or international. 172 Currently, the federal circuits are split between liberal and stringent approaches. 173 The former includes the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, while the latter includes the Third, Sixth, Eighth,
and District of Columbia Circuits. 174 All FRAND-related ASI cases to date
have been litigated in either the Fifth or Ninth Circuits (probably the result of
forum shopping). The following analysis focuses only on the liberal approach.

1. Microsoft v. Motorola
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., a U.S. federal district court granted
an ASI that prohibited Motorola from enforcing a German judgment. 175
Motorola was the owner of some SEPs in wireless and video standards, including certain European patents. When Motorola and Microsoft failed to
agree on the licensing terms of the SEPs, Microsoft sued Motorola in U.S.
federal court, alleging breach of the FRAND commitment. 176 In other words,
the U.S. court was asked to rule on the licensing term issue. 177 Several months
into the U.S. litigation, Motorola filed a proceeding in Germany, alleging Microsoft’s infringement of the European patents. 178 Since German law did not
recognize the implementer’s third-party right to enforce the FRAND commitment, the German court did not allow Microsoft to rely on such a commitment
as a valid defense. 179 Consequently, the court held that Microsoft had infringed on Motorola’s SEPs and granted an injunction against Microsoft’s
169.
See supra text accompanying note 74.
170.
Bermann, supra note 2, at 594–95.
171.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
172.
Even for local cases, the full faith and credit clause does not apply. See Bermann,
supra note 2, at 599.
173.
Tsilikas, supra note 1, at 731; see also Contreras & Eixenberger, supra note 1, at
544–45 (classifying U.S. judicial approaches to ASI into liberal, conservative, and the middleground approaches); BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 551.
174.
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 552–53; Contreras & Eixenberger, supra note
1, at 453–54; Tsilikas, supra note 1, at 731.
175.
Microsoft Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1103–04.
176.
The standard involved was RAND under ITU’s policy, but for easy reference, the
article uses the term FRAND for all references of RAND, given the concepts of the two terms
are the same. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).
177.
For the licensing term issue, see supra note 55.
178.
Microsoft Corp., 696 F.3d at 879.
179.
Id.
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sale of its products in Germany. 180 Microsoft then applied to the federal district court to enjoin Motorola from enforcing the German judgment. 181 After
the court granted the injunction, Motorola appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit applied a three-stage test for the ASI: (1) whether the
parties and issues are the same, and whether the important policy of the forum
is frustrated; (2) whether one of the Unterweser elements is present; and (3)
whether the intrusion to comity is tolerable. At the first stage, the critical issue
is whether the issues are the same, i.e., whether the U.S. proceedings can dispose of the foreign proceedings. The court answered in affirmative. In the
court’s view, since European patents were part of the portfolio covered by the
U.S. proceedings, the resolution of the contractual issue in the U.S. courts
would dispose of the patent infringement issue in Germany. 182 Had Microsoft
asked the U.S. court to rule on the infringement of the European patents, that
would not have been possible, as patent law is territorial in nature. 183 However, Microsoft’s claim in the U.S. court was “not the patents themselves, but
‘a contract between the parties’ not to enforce the patents.” 184 Analogizing
the FRAND commitment to a forum selection clause, the court found the German patent infringement suit to be inconsistent with the FRAND commitment:
In sum, whether or not the district court ultimately determines that
Motorola breached its contract with the ITU (it may or may not
have), it is clear that there is a contract, that it is enforceable by Microsoft, and that it encompasses not just U.S. patents but also the
patents at issue in the German suit. Moreover, even if Motorola did
not breach its contract, then, however the [FRAND] rate is to be determined under the ITU standards, injunctive relief against infringement is arguably a remedy inconsistent with the licensing commitment. 185
This can be viewed as the court’s interpretation of the negotiation issue
of FRAND disputes. 186 Since both the U.S. and German claims are under the
“contractual umbrella,” 187 the first stage was satisfied.
The court also found the second stage to be satisfied. Here, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed the district court’s finding that the German proceeding was
“vexatious,” one of the Unterweser factors. The district court considered

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
1978)).
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
Id. (quoting W. Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 450 F. Supp. 835, 838 (S.D. Fla.
Id. at 884–85.
See supra text accompanying note 56.
Microsoft Corp., 696 F.3d at 883.
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Motorola’s filing of the German suit several months into the U.S. suit as raising “concerns of forum shopping and duplicative and vexatious litigation.” 188
The district court also highlighted that the German suit involved only two of
the 100 Motorola-owned patents. Accordingly, the German suit was found to
be vexatious, which placed external pressure on Microsoft to succumb to an
unfavorable license. 189 The Ninth Circuit only gave limited support to the district court finding, holding that it “may not be the only possible interpretation,
[but] it is not ‘illogical, implausible, or without support from inferences that
may be drawn from facts in the record.’”190
Finally, the court also regarded the intrusion to comity as tolerable. As
stated above, U.S. courts only unilaterally project the extent of interference
to the foreign country in the assessment of comity. 191 In addition, that calculation “requires not that [the courts] calculate the precise quantum of the injunction’s interference with comity, but only that we estimate whether any
such interference is so great as to be intolerable.” 192 Applying the test, the
court concluded that the ASI simply suspended the enforcement of German
judgment until the conclusion of the U.S. proceedings. The court also drew
support by designating the dispute as a “private dispute under Washington
state contract law, between two U.S. corporations.” 193 Accordingly, the court
granted the ASI in favor of Microsoft.
However, this private-public distinction is rather artificial, given that it
only focused on the involvement of public international law.194 Even if both
parties were U.S. corporations, the court clearly did not consider Germany’s
sovereign interest in seeing German patent rights being protected in Germany. 195 This is not to mention the national interest in FRAND-encumbered
SEPs discussed above. 196 Further, the impact of the ASI on the German proceeding may not be as temporary as the court made it out to be. Once the
FRAND terms are set by the U.S. court, there will be three possibilities. First,
the parties agree to enter into a license agreement, which prohibits Motorola
from enforcing the German injunction. Second, if Motorola decides that the
FRAND terms set by the U.S. court are not favorable and refuses to license
the SEP to Microsoft, it will also be impossible for Motorola to enforce the
injunction. This is because the enforcement in that case will be a clear breach
of FRAND terms and thus likely to be subject to another ASI by the U.S.
188.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
189.
Id.
190.
Microsoft Corp., 696 F.3d at 886 (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247,
1251 (9th Cir. 2009)). Note also that the Ninth Circuit did not rule on the second justification
of the district court.
191.
See id. at 881.
192.
Id. at 886.
193.
Id. at 888.
194.
See id.
195.
See infra text accompanying note 422.
196.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–151.
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court. 197 Third, if Microsoft considers the FRAND terms set by the U.S. court
unfavorable and decides not to enter into a license agreement thereunder, it
will then be subject to enforcement if it continues to utilize the SEP in Germany. Accordingly, in only one of the three scenarios will the German injunction be temporarily suspended, while in the other cases, the right to enforce the injunction will be lost permanently.
This case presents three significant impacts. First, as will be shown below, the issues analyzed by the court in each of the three stages are often the
key legal issues to subsequent ASI proceedings: (1) do the foreign proceedings involve the same issue? (“disposition issue”); (2) is the foreign proceeding vexatious? (“vexation issue”); and (3) does the temporary suspension of
foreign proceeding violate comity? (“comity issue”). The case therefore sets
up the framework of analysis for not only the U.S. courts but also for other
courts worldwide. Although the ASI tests are certainly different among the
countries, the factors considered in these three stages are common sense. For
the disposition issue, since ASIs mainly deals with parallel proceedings, 198
courts invariably consider the extent to which foreign and local proceedings
overlap. This may not be an independent condition in some jurisdictions per
se, 199 but could still be considered under other stages, such as vexation. 200
Similarly, the standards required at this stage could be different. The U.S.
standard is relatively high, as it requires local proceedings capable of handling all issues in the foreign proceedings. 201 In the reverse case of AASIs, it
is often seen that courts deny any overlap between local and foreign proceedings to justify the issuance of an AASI. 202 The vexation issue considers how
foreign proceedings can prejudice the interests of private parties. This is in
direct contrast to the comity issue, which handles the interests of foreign
courts. No matter how the tests are actually formulated, courts invariably consider these interests, even though the emphasis could be different.
Second, the case clearly illustrates the benefits of ASIs. Given the difference between U.S. law and German law on the enforceability of FRAND
commitments (the enforceability issue), 203 the ASI ensured that U.S. law
would have the final say on the matter. Finally, the case also illustrates the
cost of ASIs on comity. In particular, most ASIs involve prohibiting only the

197.
See Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2019] EWCA
(Civ) 38 [98(v)] for the position under English law.
198.
Though under English law, this may not always be the case. See Hartley, supra note
67, at 494–95.
199.
For example, English law does not have the same disposition requirement. Id. at 496.
200.
See infra text accompanying note 394.
201.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1089 (W.D. Wash.
2012) (“Anti-suit injunctions are only appropriate when the domestic action is capable of disposing of all the issues in the foreign action.”).
202.
See infra text accompanying note 383.
203.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
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initiation or continuance of foreign proceedings. However, the anti-enforcement injunction prohibits the enforcement of a foreign judgment resulting
from a completed foreign proceeding.204 In some jurisdictions, such anti-enforcement injunction is subject to a higher threshold than other ASIs.205 This
is mainly because the “vast amounts of judicial time and costs” the foreign
court expended on the case is more significant after the whole proceedings
have been completed. 206 Yet, the Ninth Circuit did not apply a different test
and thus showed a strong willingness to grant ASIs to preserve the local proceeding. Whatever the justification, the objective result of the case is that a
German judgment on German patents, having gone through the proper judicial process of Germany, was not given effect in Germany.

2. TCL v. Ericsson
In TCL Communication Technology Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget
LM Ericsson, TCL claimed a breach of contract against Ericsson concerning
the latter’s obligation to license its SEPs on FRAND terms. 207 TCL also applied for an ASI against Ericsson’s patent infringement actions in France,
Brazil, Russia, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Germany, and the Eastern
District of Texas. 208 The court granted an ASI enjoining proceedings in seven
other jurisdictions. Most of the legal issues highlighted in Microsoft were not
tested. When granting the ASI, the court considered only the parties’ agreement that the U.S. global royalty determination would be “dispositive” of all
foreign patent actions. 209 The only issue in dispute was simply whether the
ASI should only bind Ericsson, but not TCL. When TCL agreed to a bilateral
injunction, the case was quickly dismissed. 210

3. Apple v. Qualcomm
The real development of the ASI regime came from the third case, Apple
Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 211 which challenged many aspects of the rules laid
down in Microsoft. Here, Qualcomm, the SEP owner, asked a federal court
to issue an ASI against Apple, the standard implementer, to enjoin Apple’s

204.
See InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889, para. 77 (India).
205.
See Sun Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. v. Hilton Int’l Manage (Maldives) Pvt. Ltd. [2019]
SGCA 10, para. 114 (Sing.).
206.
Id.
207.
TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14cv-00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015).
208.
Id. at *10–14.
209.
Id. at *16–19.
210.
Id. at *18–19.
211.
Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145835 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017).
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concurrent proceedings in eleven other jurisdictions. 212 Applying the Microsoft three-part inquiry, the court rejected the ASI. On the disposition issue,
the court concluded that the legal issues overseas were not the same as those
in the United States, and thus the U.S. action would not dispose of the foreign
actions. 213 Here, the foreign proceedings filed by Apple were not patent infringement, as in the case of Microsoft. Instead, they involved Apple’s challenges of the validity and exhaustion of Qualcomm’s foreign patents and
Qualcomm’s potential violation of foreign antitrust law caused by its licensing practices. 214 Unlike Microsoft, this time, it was the implementer’s foreign
proceedings that were subject to the ASI. Since Apple, as the implementer,
did not make the FRAND commitment like Motorola did in Microsoft, the
court thought that the analogy to the forum selection clause used by the Microsoft court could not be applied to Apple. 215 Thus, “even if [the US court]
ultimately sets a worldwide FRAND rate for Qualcomm’s global portfolio,
Apple’s patent claims for invalidity and exhaustion under foreign law as to
foreign patents will remain unaddressed.” 216 Many of the court’s ensuing
analysis in the second and third stages relied on the same reasoning.
In connection with the Unterweser factors applied, the court first considered Apple’s foreign suits to be not vexatious or oppressive. Even though the
foreign proceedings were all subsequent to U.S. proceedings, the court observed that the foreign proceedings were all filed before the parties’ pleadings
were finalized. 217 The court also did not find any other equitable considerations as being present. Most notably, unlike the Microsoft district court, it did
not see the overseas’ actions as a tactic to gain leverage. Citing again the
difference in the legal issues raised abroad, the court found that Apple’s pursuit of foreign actions was “legitimate.” 218 Since there was a legitimate issue
to decide in the foreign proceedings, judicial resources were also not
“wasted” in those proceedings. 219 Finally, the possibility of inconsistent judgments was not a concern. Here, the court saw that possibility as a result of
Qualcomm asking the court to determine the global FRAND rate. It was
“Qualcomm [who] placed global relief on the table, not Apple.” 220 Thus,
Qualcomm could not complain when its counterclaim for global relief

212.
Id. at *12.
213.
Id. at *19.
214.
Id. at *33–34.
215.
Id. at *31.
216.
Id. at *37.
217.
Id. at *39.
218.
Id. at *41–42.
219.
Id. at *45–46. Note here that the court relied on China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V.
Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987), a decision by the Second Circuit which adopted a
narrower view of ASIs than the Ninth Circuit. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 560–
62.
220.
Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835, at *48.
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brought home inconsistent judgments in the end. In sum, while the court applied the same Unterweser factors, it interpreted them more narrowly than the
courts did in Microsoft.
On comity, the court distinguished the case from Microsoft. Unlike the
latter, many of the foreign suits involved claims of violating foreign antitrust
laws. It is thus not purely private matters. 221 The court also cited many foreign
antitrust investigations on Qualcomm’s questionable licensing practices. 222
However, it is difficult to see how overseas antisuit claims make that much
of a difference. After all, even if the overseas claims were based on antitrust
law, they were still private claims. In addition, Qualcomm only sought to enjoin the private actions initiated by Apple. It did not seek to enjoin the foreign
actions initiated by foreign authorities.
Although Apple may be reconciled with Microsoft on the distinction of
the reverse roles of the SEP owner and implementer, it is clear that the Apple
court sought to cut back on the rather broad application of the three-stage test.
This reactionary approach might be prompted by the substantial impact that
a successful ASI could have internationally, as that would have enjoined the
then-existing proceedings in eleven other jurisdictions.

4. Huawei v. Samsung
The differing approaches in Microsoft and Apple were tested in Huawei
Technologies Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Huawei I), where both parties
owned SEPs but failed to negotiate a global patent cross-license to each
other. 223 Huawei filed a suit in a U.S. district court seeking a global FRAND
cross-license and several patent infringement suits in China against Samsung. 224 The Chinese court determined that Samsung infringed on Huawei’s
patents and issued an injunction against the infringement. 225 Based on Samsung’s application, the U.S. district court then enjoined Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions. 226 At first glance, the facts are similar to those in
Microsoft, where a U.S. proceeding on FRAND rate setting was followed by
a patent infringement case heard by a foreign court. Unsurprisingly, the court
followed the framework of analysis of Microsoft. 227 However, it was Huawei,
the implementer, who initiated the U.S. suit. In addition, the Chinese suit was
filed just one day after the U.S. suit. The Chinese court also considered the
FRAND commitment, unlike the German court which failed to do so in Microsoft. The court, however, considered these factual distinctions as irrelevant
221.
Id. at *52–54.
222.
Id. at *54–57.
223.
Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018).
224.
Id. at *11.
225.
Id. at *12.
226.
Id. at *7.
227.
Id. at *17–40.
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to the disposition issue. 228 The court held that its adjudication of the FRAND
dispute would dispose of Chinese questions—whether Huawei’s FRAND
commitment would contractually relinquish its right to seek injunctive relief. 229 This is because “[b]oth parties have presented [before the court] with
a breach of contract claim based on the other’s alleged failure to abide by its
commitments to [the subject SSO European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI)].” 230
Regarding the Unterweser factors, the court found that there was frustration with the forum’s policy, as there would be a chance for inconsistent judgment if the ASI was not granted. 231 However, unlike the German lawsuit in
Motorola, which was filed several months after the U.S. proceedings, Huawei
essentially filed the Chinese lawsuit concurrently with the U.S. lawsuit. The
Chinese lawsuit was therefore not vexatious or oppressive. 232 Nonetheless,
since the test only requires one Unterweser factor to apply, the second stage
was satisfied.
Finally, adopting Microsoft’s line of reasoning, the court was of the opinion that there was a “negligible impact on comity.”233 Like Microsoft, the
court thought that the ASI only temporarily restrained Huawei from enforcing
the Chinese injunction until it could rule on the issues in front of the court. 234
In effect, the Chinese injunction was suspended for only a few months, while
it remained possible for Huawei to seek damages. 235 Once again, the court
also pointed to the fact that the Chinese injunction only involved two patents. 236 It must be noted, however, that the interference to comity in this case
may be more severe than in Microsoft. Here, neither party was a U.S. enterprise, whereas in Microsoft, both parties were U.S. companies. Even though
Huawei is not a state-owned enterprise, it is strategically important to China
as one of the largest telecommunication companies in the country.
After Huawei I, the U.S. approach may be described as follows: (i) if
there is a jurisdictional conflict between a U.S. suit on a global FRAND contract and a foreign patent infringement suit, the U.S. courts (or at least the
Ninth Circuit) will adopt a rather liberal test for an ASI; (ii) however, if the
conflict involves only a U.S. suit on global FRAND contract and a foreign
suit on patent invalidity and/or antitrust filed by the implementer, the U.S.
courts will be reluctant to grant an ASI. Accordingly, under this general proposition, the U.S. approach to ASIs is more favorable to standard implementer
228.
Id.
229.
Id. at *17.
230.
Id. at *26.
231.
Id. at *34.
232.
Id. at *37.
233.
Id. at *40.
234.
Id. at *39.
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at *40. Note however that the Ninth Circuit discussed this under the “vexation”
factor at stage two. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 882–86 (9th Cir. 2012).
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than the SEP owner. While an ASI is only more likely to be granted under
scenario (i) above, it is already sufficient to attract rather hostile reactions
from foreign courts. 237
In subsequent cases, the filing of ASIs in U.S. courts triggered foreign
courts to issue AASIs. 238 These AASIs will be discussed further below.
China, however, took the opposite path. Instead of issuing AASIs, Chinese
courts took a page from the U.S. courts’ playbook and began issuing ASIs.
This, ironically, resulted in the U.S. court issuing an AASI against the Chinese ASI in Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Ericsson v. Samsung). 239 The preliminary injunction requires, inter alia, Samsung to reimburse Ericsson for any fines it incurs in China due to violating the Chinese
ASI by litigating in the Texas action. Before we discuss Ericsson, we will
first introduce the development of the Chinese approach to ASIs.

B. China
After Chinese companies were on the receiving end of the ASIs in TCL
and Huawei I, one might expect China to develop a kind of AASI as a defense.
This is because China actually had a precedent for issuing that kind of injunction in an earlier maritime case. 240 With the determination of FRAND issues
highly dependent on the governing law and thus the forum, the best way to
ensure a country’s standard is to ensure that its courts serve as the only fora.
ASIs will greatly facilitate that. This explains why China did not pursue the
AASI path and opted to develop its ASI regime.
However, there is no clear legal basis for granting ASIs under Chinese
law. 241 Chinese civil procedure law also allows parallel proceedings. 242 This
means that the Chinese courts may assume jurisdiction over a case even if
another proceeding on the same matter has already been initiated in another
country. These factors, combined with the first international response to the
threat of a U.S. ASI being an AASI by a German court, suggest that Chinese
courts should follow suit and grant an AASI to defend its jurisdiction against
the encroachment of an U.S. ASI. 243 Surprisingly, China decided to take a
237.
See infra Part IV.D.
238.
See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426
(Fr.).
239.
Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL 89980
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
240.
See Guangjian Tu, The Latest Development on Anti-suit Injunction Wielded by Chinese Courts to Restrain Foreign Parallel Proceedings, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (July 9, 2021),
https://conflictoflaws.net/2021/the-latest-development-on-anti-suit-injunction-wielded-by-chinese-courts-to-restrain-foreign-parallel-proceedings.
241.
See Tang, supra note 5.
242.
See ZHENG SOPHIA TANG ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 91 (2016).
243.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333/19
(Ger.).
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more aggressive approach and started granting ASIs instead. Out of the blue,
the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) granted an ASI under the behavior preservation provision of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law in Huawei Technology
Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (Huawei II). Prior to the case,
the provision was used for an entirely different purpose. 244 Ever since Huawei
II, Chinese courts have issued four more ASIs in a span of just five months.
Despite hostile countermeasures from foreign courts, there is no sign that
Chinese courts are slowing down on the issuance of ASIs. To the contrary,
Chinese courts have been even more aggressive than the U.S. courts in issuing
ASIs.

1. Huawei v. Conversant
In Huawei II, the SPC granted an injunction prohibiting Conversant from
enforcing an injunction against Huawei in Germany. The facts of the case
greatly resemble those in Microsoft, as does the test adopted by the SPC. 245
The court set out a five-factor test to decide whether to issue an ASI. 246 These
factors are as follows:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

the effect of the enforcement of the foreign judgment on litigation in China;
necessity of taking behavior preservation measures;
the reasonable balance of the interests of the applicant and the
respondent;
whether the behavior preservation measures harm the public interest; and
consideration of international comity. 247

Factor (i) relates to the disposition issue. The court considered that the enforcement of German injunction would have interfered with Chinese proceedings, thus making these proceedings and their resulting judgments meaningless. 248 However, this is no more than a conclusory statement without
elaborating how the enforcement of the German injunction would lead to the
negative effects. In particular, unlike Microsoft, where the U.S. courts were
244.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (୰⌵ਕඹᅜ宰
宣ἲ) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 27, 2017, effective July 1, 2017), art. 100.; Tang, supra note
5.
245.
Cotter; supra note 34, at 20; Tang, supra note 5.
246.
Although the SPC did not mention it in the judgment, the test is clearly based on the
SPC guideline on intellectual property preservation. See infra note 256 and Oppo, supra note
111 which applied the said guideline.
247.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Kang Wensen Wuxian Xuke Youxian Gongsi (ॾ
Ѫᢰᵟᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ) [Huawei Tech. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L.], 2019 Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 732, 733, 734 (Sup. People's Ct. Aug.
28, 2020) (China) [hereinafter Huawei II].
248.
Id.
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asked to set the global FRAND terms, the Chinese proceedings only relate
the setting of FRAND terms for Chinese patents. 249 It is therefore impossible
to say that the Chinese proceedings would dispose of German proceedings
that dealt with the infringement of German patents. It is, perhaps, for this
reason that the SPC did not follow the exact terminologies adopted by the
U.S. courts. However, in doing so, the Chinese test is clearly broader than its
U.S. counterpart.
Any negative impact by enforcement is likely to be economic or strategic
rather than legal. This is shown in the SPC’s discussion in Factor (ii). If Samsung manages to enforce the German injunction, it will put pressure on
Huawei to either be kicked out of the German market, or to accept the higher
FRAND rate set by the German court (18.3 times higher than the rate set by
the Chinese court). 250 Relatively speaking, the pressure imposed on Ericsson
by a favorable Chinese judgment will be substantially reduced. This argument
effectively resembles the vexation issue. However, the correlation (or in the
term of the SPC court, necessity) between the enforcement of the German
injunction and the Chinese proceedings may not be as obvious as the SPC
made it out to be. Once again, the German injunction dealt with German patents, while the Chinese injunction dealt with Chinese patents. Accepting the
German rate for the use of SEP in Germany does not mean that Huawei will
have to pay the German rate in China for the Chinese patents. In fact, the
Chinese rate will be set by the Chinese courts. Additionally, while the difference between the FRAND rates of the two countries appears to be substantial,
it must be noted that even if a court is to set global FRAND rates, the rates
are likely to be different for different parts of the world even if the SEPs belong to the same family. 251 The German rate was approved as being in compliance with the FRAND terms by the German court for using German patents
in Germany. Even if it appeared to be high, the courts never discussed the
underlying bases upon which the German court set the rate. In any event, it
seems reasonable for Ericsson to want to set a high asking price for negotiation. It does not necessarily mean that the initial asking price will be the final
price agreed upon by the parties. Factor (iv), public policy, is also another
Unterweser factor, 252 though there was no substantive discussion there by the
SPC.
Factors (iii) and (v) relate to the comity issue. Under both factors, the
SPC relied substantially on the temporary nature of the ASI in the enforce-

249.
Id.
250.
Id.
251.
In Unwired Planet v Huawei, under the global rates set by the English court, the
Chinese royalty rates were 50% lower than the rest of the world. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd.
v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [47] (appeal taken from Eng.).
252.
This is the frustration of a policy of the forum issuing the injunction. See Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 882–86 (9th Cir. 2012).
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ment of the German injunction. On first glance, this argument may be substantially the same as the one given in Microsoft and Huawei I. However, the
impact on comity is indeed lower in this case, as the Chinese courts were only
setting FRAND rates for Chinese patents. Ultimately, although the Chinese
proceedings would still put pressure on Conversant to enter into a global license agreement and thus preempt its enforcement of the German injunction,
the Chinese proceedings do not impose legal liability on Conversant if it decides not to enter into a global license. Under Factor (v), the SPC also considers the sequence of the litigations. As the Chinese proceedings were initiated first, the court thought that this justified the ASI from a comity
perspective. 253
In summary, the ASI test under Huawei II has a lower threshold compared with that of the United States (particularly due to its substitution of the
disposition requirement with “negative effect,” and its more flexible application on vexatious and comity factors). In addition, non-compliance will be
punished by a daily fine of RMB 1 million, and the ASI proceeding was conducted ex parte. 254 Although the judgment never referred to the national interest of China, subsequent reports of the case by the Chinese legal media
complimented how the issuance of ASIs promoted the national interest of
China. 255 The SPC also issued an “adjudication guidelines” in February 2021,
codifying the five-factor test set out in Huawei II.256

2. ZTE v. Conversant
Within five months, four more ASIs were issued by lower courts. The
simplest is ZTE Corp. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing Co. (ZTE), 257 a companion case to Huawei II. The German injunction obtained by the Conversant
also applied to ZTE. Thus, after Huawei II, ZTE applied to the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court for an ASI. The court directly applied the SPC’s
253.
Huawei II, supra note 247. The sequence of litigations was considered under the
vexation issue in Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145835, at *23–24 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017). Yet, it should be noted that the German
proceedings were filed just three months after the Chinese proceedings. In Apple, that kind of
time gap was not considered substantial enough to warrant designating foreign proceedings as
vexatious. Apple, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835, at *38–42.
254.
Huawei II, supra note 247.
255.
See, e.g., The First Anti-Suit Injunction Issued by China’s Intellectual Property
Trial—The Collegiate Panel of the Case Explained in Detail the Standard Essential Patent License Dispute Between Convenson and Huawei, INTELL. PROP. CT. OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S
CT. (Feb. 26, 2021, 10:49 AM), http://ipc.court.gov.cn/zh-cn/news/view-1056.html.
256.
Judgment Digests of the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People’s Court,
S UPREME P EOPLE ’ S C T . (Feb. 26, 2021), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing288131.html.
257.
Zhongxing Tongxun Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Kang Wensen Wuxian Xuke
Youxian Gongsi (ѝޤ䙊䇟㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ) [ZTE Corp. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing Co.], Yue 03 Min Chu No. 335 (Shenzhen Interm. People’s Ct. Sept.
28, 2020) (China).
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reasoning for every factor and granted an ASI against the German injunction. 258 The case was selected as a Guangdong top ten intellectual properties
event in 2020. 259 The Guangdong court system also highlighted how the case
promoted the national interest of China through perfecting the ASI regime. 260

3. Oppo v. Sharp
Another important case is Oppo v. Sharp (Oppo), which was also selected
as a 2020 Ten Landmark Intellectual Property Case by the SPC alongside
Huawei II. 261 Here, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court issued another
ASI against the Japanese company Sharp and its Chinese subsidiary in favor
of Oppo, a major Chinese telecommunication company. The case is significant because it was considered to be the first case where a Chinese court issued a worldwide ASI, instead of targeting a specific jurisdiction, as was the
case in Huawei II. 262 The expanded scope coincided with the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court’s confirmation that Chinese courts had jurisdiction to
set the global FRAND rate in an earlier case between the same parties. 263
Prior to that decision, the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) was of the opinion that
Chinese courts did not have such jurisdiction. 264 This formed the basis for the
UKSC’s rejection of ZTE’s forum non conveniens claim. 265 Within just one
month of that decision, Chinese courts quickly assumed the jurisdiction to set
a global rate and further expanded the scope of its ASI to the world. 266 How-

258.
Id.
259.
See Top Ten Intellectual Property Cases in Guangdong Province in 2020, GUANGDONG
POL. & LEGAL NETWORK (Apr. 22, 2022), http://www.gdzf.org.cn/zwgd/202104
/t20210422_1073020.htm.
260.
Id.
261.
See Top 10 IP Cases and 50 Typical IP Cases in Chinese Courts in 2020, SUPREME
PEOPLE’S CT. (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-297991.html.
262.
See Request for Information Pursuant to Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, Communication from the European Union to China, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/682 (June 7, 2021).
263.
Oppo, supra note 111
264.
See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [97] (appeal
taken from Eng.).
265.
See id. at [98].
266.
See Xiapu Zhushi Huishe, Sai’enbeiji Riben Zhushi Huishe Su OPPO Guangdong
Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi, OPPO Guangdong Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi Shenzhen Fen Gongsi (༿ᲞṚᔿՊ⽮ˈ䎋ᚙؽਹᰕᵜṚᔿՊ⽮䇹OPPOᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀
ޜਨˈOPPOᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀ޜਨ␡ൣ࠶ޜਨ) [Sharp Corp. v. OPPO Guangdong Mobile
Telecommunications Co.], 2020 Zhi Min Xia Zhong No. 517 (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 19, 2021)
(China). Interestingly, in a subsequent case regarding whether English court should decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens in light of the Chinese courts’ proclamation of its ability to
set global rates, the English court did not consider that fact alone changed the analysis, and
rejected to stay the proceedings based on the characterization of the English dispute as one
primarily dealing with the infringement of UK patents. See Nokia Techs. OY v. OnePlus Tech.
(Shenzhen) Co. [2021] EWHC (Pat) 2952 [36]–[48] (Eng.).
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ever, the Oppo court limited the worldwide ASI to Sharp filing new infringement cases or applying for new relief. 267 Thus, it did not affect the proceedings already filed in Germany, Taiwan, and Japan. 268 The court used the forward-looking nature of the ASI to justify its worldwide scope. The case was
touted to have transformed China from a “follower of international intellectual property rules” to a “guide of international intellectual property rules.” 269

4. Xiaomi v. InterDigital
In Xiaomi Communication Technology Co. v. InterDigital Holdings, Inc.
(Xiaomi), 270 the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court granted a worldwide
ASI against InterDigital in favor of Xiaomi, which forbade InterDigital from
claiming its SEPs against Xiaomi anywhere in the world, pending the court’s
determination of a global FRAND rate. As Yu and Contreras indicate, this
ASI is “more sweeping than any ASI issued in US or other countries in
FRAND cases” because “its geographic scope is not limited to the country in
which InterDigital sought injunctive relief (India).” 271 The scope is also
broader than Oppo, as it applied to existing foreign actions (one filed in India)
and future actions (one subsequently filed in Germany). 272 Interestingly, the
Wuhan court did not address the impact of the worldwide ASI on comity.
Like Oppo, the Wuhan court was also asked by the implementer (Xiaomi in
this case) to set the global FRAND rate. These two cases therefore aligned
the Chinese ASIs to Microsoft as far as the disposition issue is concerned, i.e.,
the setting of the global FRAND rate by Chinese courts would have resolved
the foreign infringement actions filed by the SEP owners.

267.
Xiapu Zhushi Huishe, Sai’enbeiji Riben Zhushi Huishe Su OPPO Guangdong
Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi, OPPO Guangdong Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
Shenzhen Fen Gongsi (༿ᲞṚᔿՊ⽮ˈ䎋ᚙؽਹᰕᵜṚᔿՊ⽮䇹OPPOᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀
ޜਨˈOPPOᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀ޜਨ␡ൣ࠶ޜਨ) [Sharp Corp. v. OPPO Guangdong Mobile
Telecommunications Co.], 2020 Zhi Min Xia Zhong No. 517 (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 19, 2021)
(China).
268.
Id.
269.
See Request for Information Pursuant to Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 262.
270.
See Xiaomi Tongxun Jishu Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Gongsi (ሿ㊣䙊䇟ᢰᵟޜਨ䇹
Ӕӂᮠᆇޜਨ) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Holdings, Inc.], E 01 Zhi Min Chu
No. 431 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 23, 2020) (China).
271.
Yang Yu & Jorge L. Contreras, Will China’s New Anti-Suit Injunctions Shift the Balance of Global FRAND Litigation?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 22, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent
/2020/10/contreras-injunctions-litigation.html.
272.
See Xiaomi Tongxun Jishu Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Gongsi (ሿ㊣䙊䇟ᢰᵟޜਨ䇹
Ӕӂᮠᆇޜਨ) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Holdings, Inc.], E 01 Zhi Min Chu
No. 431 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 23, 2020) (China).
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5. Samsung v. Ericsson
The latest ASI case in China is Samsung Electronics Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson in which the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court similarly granted an injunction forbidding Ericsson from claiming its SEPs anywhere in the world pending the court’s determination of a global rate. 273 Here,
the Wuhan court made the ASI even more aggressive by adding an AAASI
on top of the ASI. 274 Under this AAASI order, Ericsson was prohibited from
asking the foreign court to enjoin Samsung’s enforcement of the ASI. 275 This
AAASI was probably prompted by the countering AASI issued by foreign
courts against the ASIs issued in Oppo and Xiaomi (these AASIs will be further discussed below). The Wuhan court therefore sought to preempt these
AASIs at the time of its issuance of the ASI. In the judgment, the court simply
justified the AAASI under the first factor, claiming that the potential AASI
issued by a foreign court would interfere with the Chinese proceedings. The
court, however, did not address the potential added damage to comity caused
by the AAASI. In the discussion of comity, it referred to the Chinese court as
being the first seized court. Procedurally, the ASIs issued by the Chinese
courts were generally made on an ex parte basis. 276 Ericsson was not aware
of the ASI application by Samsung until the ASI was issued by the court on
Christmas day in 2020. 277 It was Samsung who asked the Wuhan court not to
notify Ericsson. 278 In the subsequent motion filed by Ericsson to reconsider
the ASI, the Wuhan court explained that the ex parte application was necessary to prevent Ericsson from applying for an AASI in foreign courts.279
The wide scope of Chinese ASI is also shown in the persons subject to
the injunction. All Chinese ASIs are directed to SEP owners and its associated
companies (not just subsidiaries). As explained by the Wuhan court in Samsung, this is to ensure Ericsson could not sue Samsung through its associated
companies. 280 Although extending the coverage of the ASI to all the associated companies appears to be overly broad, it may be justified by the fact that

273.
See Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung
Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
274.
Id.
275.
Id.
276.
The only exception appears to be Oppo.
277.
Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL 89980, at
*3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
278.
See also id. at *2. It appears that the ex parte application was suggested by Samsung
in the first place. See id. at *5.
279.
See Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung
Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
280.
Id.
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the SEP owners would usually give the FRAND undertaking on its own behalf and for its affiliates. 281
Given the expansive scope of the Chinese ASI, a clash with the U.S. jurisdiction seemed inevitable. This happened when Ericsson applied to a U.S.
court for an AASI to enjoin Samsung from enforcing the ASI obtained from
the Wuhan court. 282 In deciding whether to grant an AASI, the U.S. court
essentially applied the same test as Microsoft for ASI. 283 This provides an
excellent opportunity to compare the two ASI regimes.
The U.S. proceeding was originally filed by Ericsson to determine the
cross-licensing FRAND issues between the parties. 284 The AASI was initially
filed by Ericsson as an emergency ex parte temporary restraining order
(TRO). 285 The U.S. court granted the TRO and subsequently granted a preliminary injunction after a hearing. 286 The court’s reasoning can be organized
under the same three-issue framework. First, on the disposition issue, the
court concluded that the Chinese and U.S. proceedings were not duplicative.
In the court’s words,
Samsung asks the Wuhan Court to determine the global licensing
terms, including the FRAND royalty rates applicable for Samsung’s
communication products implementing all of Ericsson’s 4G and 5G
SEPs. Ericsson, on the other hand, asks this Court to look at the parties’ pre-suit negotiation conduct and determine whether the parties
breached or complied with their mutual FRAND obligations. The
Wuhan Court is asked to provide a number. This Court is asked to
evaluate conduct. The legal questions presented to each Court are
different. 287
In other words, the Chinese proceedings were concerned with licensing
terms issues, while the U.S. proceedings were concerned with negotiation issues. 288 It is not surprising that the two courts disagree on the characterization
of the issue. As mentioned above in the discussion of Huawei II, the SPC only
requires foreign proceedings to negatively affect the Chinese proceedings,
281.
See, e.g., EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETIS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS POLICY 43 (2021), https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf; Unwired
Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [14] (appeal taken from Eng.).
282.
Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980.
283.
Id. at *3–4. Note that the AASI test adopted by the Texas court only includes the
analysis of the Unterweser factors and thus only the second stage of the three-stage inquiry for
ASI adopted by the Ninth Circuit. The analysis of the first stage is incorporated in the analysis
of the “vexation” factor, namely, “the extent to which the foreign suit is duplicative of the litigation in the United States,” while third stage was covered by the factor regarding other equitable principles. Id. at *4–7.
284.
Id. at *6 & n.10.
285.
Id. at *3.
286.
Id.
287.
Id. at *6.
288.
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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including economic and strategic effects, 289 given the interrelated nature of
the licensing terms and negotiation issues. However, under the U.S. standard,
even if the issues are interrelated, the determination of the royalty rates will
not result in violation of the FRAND commitment in the negotiation process.
On the vexation issue, the U.S. court took issue on the ex parte application process of the Chinese ASI. Although the AASI application in the U.S.
court was also initiated as an ex parte TRO, the court distinguished it from
the ex parte process in China on both the duration and burden of proof to
overturn the injunction. While the TRO typically lasts no more than fourteen
days pursuant to the Federal Rules of Procedure, the Chinese ASI lasts until
the end of the Chinese proceedings, which could take years. 290 Once the TRO
lapses, the petitioner has the burden of proof in the subsequent motion for
preliminary injunction. However, in the Chinese ASI process, if the injunction is to be overturned, it is the respondent who has the burden of proof in
the motion to reconsider, which must be filed within five days of the ASI.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. court was of the opinion that Samsung’s real
motivation behind the ASI was to weaken Ericsson’s negotiating position regarding cross-licensing. 291 Comparatively, considering that the United States
is the largest market for both parties, the U.S. proceedings were not vexatious
or oppressive, to which Samsung also agreed. 292 Accordingly, the U.S. court
concluded the Chinese ASI resulted in an inequitable hardship on Ericsson.293
In addition, the court also considered the worldwide nature of the Chinese
ASI to be inequitable. With this ASI, Samsung limited Ericsson to litigate on
FRAND disputes in the Wuhan Court, yet it filed injunctive relief in the U.S.
International Trade Commission. The court considered this disparity in tribunal to be “the height of inequity (and hypocrisy).”294 Overall, the court was
highly critical of Samsung’s litigation strategy, saying that the FRAND issues
“should be resolved on the merits and not based on unfair economic leverage
gained through litigious gamesmanship. Equity demands no less.” 295
On interference to comity, it is much easier to justify the AASI than the
ASI given that the former only seeks to preserve the local proceedings instead
of interfering with foreign proceedings. Even after the AASI was granted,
Samsung could still continue with the Wuhan proceedings regarding global
royalty rates. The U.S. court also referred to the private nature of the FRAND
litigation, just as the Ninth Circuit did in Microsoft. 296 The contrast between

289.
See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
290.
Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980, at *5.
291.
Id. (“Ericsson argues this was the real motivation behind the ASI. This Court does
not disagree.”).
292.
Id.
293.
Id.
294.
Id. at *7.
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
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the courts’ comity considerations is particularly apparent if one refers to the
Wuhan court’s judgments. The Wuhan court only cited the fact that it was the
first seized court to justify interference to international comity. 297 In its subsequent motion to reconsider, the court did not provide any further justification on comity. 298
To minimize the impact on comity and intrusion to the Chinese jurisdiction, the U.S. court declined to grant Ericsson’s request to order Samsung to
withdraw the ASI, keeping the AASI’s scope to the preservation of the court’s
jurisdiction on U.S. patents only. 299 To do otherwise would certainly help Ericsson, since it would no longer be subject to the worldwide ASI in a third
country (such as Germany). However, the court’s decision is certainly sensible, as some U.S. courts have long cautioned that the United States should
not seek to play the role of police:
Comity dictates that foreign antisuit injunctions be issued sparingly
and only in the rarest of cases. The days of American hegemony over
international economic affairs have long since passed. The United
States cannot today impose its economic will on the rest of the world
and expect meek compliance, if indeed it ever could. The modern era
is one of world economic interdependence, and economic interdependence requires cooperation and comity between nations. In an increasingly international market, commercial transactions involving
players from multiple nations have become commonplace. Every
one of these transactions presents the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of the nations of the parties involved concerning
any dispute arising in the transaction. 300
Furthermore, the court did not seek to directly interfere with the Chinese
court’s penalty for non-compliance with the ASI. Instead, the court simply
ordered Samsung to indemnify Ericsson for any such penalty. 301

6. Comparison between the United States and China
The ASI regimes of China and the United States share many characteristics. Both countries remain the only jurisdictions to date that have issued ASIs
in FRAND matters. This similarity is understandable. FRAND terms relate
to standard setting in the most cutting-edge technologies for the world. With
the two countries being the largest technology markets in the world, they
297.
Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
298.
Id.
299.
Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980, at *8.
300.
Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal
citation omitted).
301.
Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980, at *8.
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share strong motivations to impose their own standards on FRAND terms.
The U.S. interest in protecting its jurisdiction on intellectual property matters
is well documented. This is reflected in a number of forum non conveniens
cases. For example, in Mintel Learning Technology, Inc. v. Beijing Kaidi Education & Technology Development Co., Ltd., the court stated that “the local
interest in resolving a local controversy at home weighs heavily in favor of
California as the place of trial. A forum has a significant interest in protecting
the intellectual property of its citizens and businesses from infringement by
foreign defendants.” 302 For China, it has been observed that technological innovation has become a “unique political and economic interest,” 303 motivating Chinese courts to exercise jurisdiction to promote China’s national interests. 304 In particular, both countries’ courts are now capable of setting global
FRAND rates. For China, it has the motivation to set a lower royalty rate
because most of its largest technology companies are standard implementers
rather than SEP owners. Its lower royalty rate in general is well illustrated in
Huawei II, with the Chinese rate being 18.3 times lower than the German
rate. 305
The ASI would mean nothing if it could not bind these sophisticated players in the technology industries. It is clear that ASIs would ordinarily not be
legally enforced outside the issuing court’s country. 306 The real enforcement
mechanism lies with the ability to conduct business operations in these countries’ respective markets. None of the key players in the technology world
could afford to lose these two markets, and failure to follow their orders
would mean exactly that. In Buchanan v. Rucker, 307 one of the most quintessential common law jurisdiction cases, the law of the island of Tobago allowed its courts to assume jurisdiction over any person in the world by nailing
a writ on the courthouse door on the island. This practice was ridiculed by the
English court: “how could that be obligatory upon the subjects of other countries? Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole
world? Would the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?” 308 One
might wonder if the end result is the same if England, a dominating market at
the time, and Tobago, an insignificant market economically, swapped places
in the case. Ridiculous as that may sound, laws passed by the United States
and China are indeed applied extraterritorially. 309 The ASI is just another,
though even more aggressive, example of such extraterritorial assertion.
302.
Mintel Learning Tech., Inc. v. Beijing Kaidi Educ. & Tech. Dev. Co., No. C 06-7541
PJH, 2007 WL 2403395, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2007).
303.
See Brief of 13 Professors, supra note 139, at 8.
304.
See TANG ET AL., supra note 242, at 50.
305.
Huawei II, supra note 247.
306.
Id.
307.
Buchanan v. Rucker (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 9 East 192 (KB).
308.
Id. at 194.
309.
See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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That said, if we were to compare the two ASI regimes, it is clear that
China, while being an up-and-comer in ASI use, is now more aggressive than
the United States. To date, China has issued the most ASIs in FRAND cases
worldwide. 310 In addition, all Chinese applications were successful, while a
couple of cases in the United States failed, most notably the Apple case. 311
Also, as highlighted above, the ASI orders from China applied much more
broadly. The last three ASIs from China apply worldwide, whereas the U.S.
ASIs only target litigation in specific jurisdictions. 312 China also remains the
only jurisdiction that has issued an AAASI on FRAND disputes. 313
China is also more aggressive in setting global FRAND rates. 314 To date,
although the U.S. courts have assumed the role of setting global FRAND rates
in several cases, the parties involved have all voluntarily submitted to the
determination of the global rates. 315 However, Chinese courts may set global
rates against the opposition of the parties, as seen in Samsung. 316
Another important but often overlooked dimension is the much lower jurisdictional threshold of Chinese courts in issuing the ASI. Although Chinese
courts did not explicitly explain the in personam nature of ASIs, it is implied
in the judgments. Having personal jurisdiction over the subject of the ASI is
therefore necessary. In ZTE, Conversant challenged the Chinese court’s personal jurisdiction over it, as it did not have a branch in China. 317 Characterizing FRAND disputes as outside the jurisdictional categories of either contract
or property, the SPC formulated a new rule that jurisdiction on FRAND disputes could be obtained after the court considers some factors, including the
place of negotiation, place of performance, and whether the party has assets
in China. 318 In Oppo, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court further

310.
See supra Table 1.
311.
Id.
312.
See Oppo, supra note 111; Xiaomi Tongxun Jishu Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Gongsi
(ሿ㊣䙊䇟ᢰᵟޜਨ䇹Ӕӂᮠᆇޜਨ) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Holdings,
Inc.], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 431 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 23, 2020) (China); Sanxing
Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Dec.
25, 2020) (China).
313.
See Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung
Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
314.
See Oppo, supra note 111.
315.
See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. [2020] UKSC 37, [68]–[74]
(appeal taken from Eng.); Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Thom Tillis et al., supra note 138, at
14–16.
316.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Thom Tillis et al., supra note 138, at 14–16.
317.
See Zhongxing Tongxun Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Kang Wensen Wuxian Xuke
Youxian Gongsi (ѝޤ䙊䇟㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ䇹ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ) [ZTE Corp. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing Co.], Yue 03 Min Chu No. 335 (Shenzhen Interm. People’s Ct. Sept.
28, 2020) (China).
318.
Id.
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pushed the boundaries by assuming jurisdiction over Sharp, the Japanese parent company that did not have operation in China, for owning Chinese patents. It was not clear whether these Chinese patents were involved in the
FRAND dispute in question. 319 The Shenzhen Court decision was subsequently upheld by the SPC. 320
The SPC also rejected the forum non conveniens request by the SEP
owner previously. 321 Given the highly stringent rules on forum non conveniens in China, such requests are unlikely to be successful. 322 Meanwhile, lack
of personal jurisdiction remains a viable defense in U.S. ASI cases for nonU.S. companies. This was the case in Lenovo (U.S.) Inc. v. IPCom GmbH &
Co. 323 As a German incorporated non-practicing entity with no clear presence
in the United States, IPCom has been resisting the assumption of jurisdiction
by U.S. courts. 324 A lower jurisdictional threshold under Chinese law greatly
facilitates the possible range of the Chinese ASI.
The combination of a lower jurisdictional threshold, worldwide ASIs, the
availability of preemptive AAASIs, and involuntary setting of global rates,
gives Chinese courts huge advantages in power-grabbing jurisdictions on
FRAND matters. In one amicus brief in the appeal of Ericsson v. Samsung at
the Federal Court of Appeals, the Chinese ASI regime was said to have given
Chinese courts a monopoly on FRAND matters and made them the “one court
to rule them all.” 325 In the motion to reconsider the same case in China, Ericsson even argued that the ASI practice was essentially a compulsory technology transfer. 326
The differences between the ASI approaches may once again be explained by differences in national interests. Of the five ASIs issued by Chi-

319.
See Oppo, supra note 111.
320.
See Xiapu Zhushi Huishe, Sai’enbeiji Riben Zhushi Huishe Su OPPO Guangdong
Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi, OPPO Guangdong Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
Shenzhen Fen Gongsi (༿ᲞṚᔿՊ⽮ˈ䎋ᚙؽਹᰕᵜṚᔿՊ⽮䇹OPPOᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀
ޜਨˈOPPOᒯь〫ࣘ䙊ؑᴹ䲀ޜਨ␡ൣ࠶ޜਨ) [Sharp Corp. v. OPPO Guangdong Mobile
Telecommunications Co.], 2020 Zhi Min Xia Zhong No. 517 (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 19, 2021)
(China).
321.
See Kang Wensen Wuxian Xuke Youxian Gongsi Zhongxing Tongxun Gufen
Youxian Gongsi zhuanli hetong jiufen (ᓧ᮷ᰐ㓯䇨ਟᴹ䲀ޜਨ, ѝޤ䙊䇟㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ
у࡙ਸ਼㓐㓧) [Conversant Wireless Licensing Co v. ZTE Corp.], 2019 Zhi Min Xia Zhong
No. 157 (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 21, 2020) (China).
322.
See SUPREME PEOPLE’S CT., INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
art. 532 (2015); TANG ET AL., supra note 242, at 108–116.
323.
See Lenovo (U.S.) Inc. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., No. 5:19-cv-01389-EJD, 2019 WL
6771784 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2019).
324.
Id. at *3–4.
325.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Thom Tillis et al., supra note 138, at 9.
326.
Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
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nese courts, four were issued in favor of Chinese telecommunication companies (Huawei, Oppo, Xiaomi, and ZTE), which happened to be four of the
largest telecommunication companies in China.327 Despite none of them being state-owned enterprises, they are all considered indispensable for the furtherance of Chinese national strategies. 328 The only exception is Samsung, a
Korean company that has large manufacturing facilities in China. This is not
to suggest that the Chinese courts were biased in the ruling of the specific
ASI, but rather that the national interest in furthering the Chinese standard of
resolving FRAND disputes likely prompted the SPC to design an ASI regime
that would better facilitate such interests, should the ASI be granted. The position of the United States is more complicated. Unlike China, the United
States has both large implementers and owners. Technology giants such as
Apple and Microsoft are usually both major SEP owners and implementers,
concurrently. From the cases, we can see that courts have been struggling
with the balancing the protection of both the SEP owners and implementers.
This probably explains not only the U.S. courts’ less aggressive ASI rules but
also the United States’ status as the only jurisdiction in the world, to date, that
has issued both ASIs and AASIs in FRAND litigations. 329

C. England
While the United States and China represent the first group of aggressive
users of ASIs, the second group comprises of jurisdictions that simply countered ASIs from the first group by issuing AASIs. 330 This group of countries
includes England, France, India, and Germany. There are clearly common
considerations in their decisions to issue AASIs in response to ASIs issued
by or ASI applications in Chinese or U.S. courts. However, each country also
has its own unique considerations, influenced by its respective legal traditions
and national interests.
As the original ASI-issuing country, England and its courts have been
issuing ASIs for centuries. 331 Since the UKSC has ruled that the English
courts have jurisdiction to set global FRAND rates, even if the parties do not
agree, 332 one might expect English courts to be active in issuing ASIs, like

327.
See supra text accompanying note 27; Team Counterpoint, Global Smartphone Market Share: By Quarter, COUNTERPOINT RSCH. (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.counterpointresearch.com/global-smartphone-share (showing the sizeable smartphone market share of these
companies).
328.
See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 27.
329.
See supra Table 1.
330.
Thus, despite the fact that the U.S. courts also granted an AASI in Ericsson v. Samsung, the United States did not fall into the second group.
331.
See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 412–24.
332.
See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [97] (appeal
taken from Eng.).
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their counterparts in the United States and China. However, due to the different ASI test under English law, a more “flexible” view on the setting of global
FRAND rate and a different national interest on FRAND-encumbered SEPs,
the English courts have adopted a vastly different perspective of AASIs. We
first look at the AASI that was actually issued by the English court.
In IPCom v. Lenovo (IPCom), IPCom asked the English court to enjoin
the English companies of the Lenovo Group (English companies) from assisting the U.S. companies of the same group (U.S. companies) in their ASI
application in a California court. 333 The court stated that the test for an AASI
is substantially similar to that of an ASI, except that greater caution needs to
be applied in granting AASIs, since “there is an even greater danger of interfering improperly with the conduct of foreign proceedings.” 334
First, this test provides that an English court may restrain a defendant
who is subject to the court’s jurisdiction from instituting or continuing foreign
proceedings when it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. 335 This
will often be the case when the court finds that the foreign proceeding is vexatious or oppressive. 336 In order to establish vexation or oppression, the court
will essentially go through a reverse exercise of forum non conveniens,
namely, (1) a finding that the English court is a natural forum, and (2) that
justice requires the claimant to refrain from continuing in the foreign proceedings. 337 Second, the court must consider the restraining influence of comity. 338 “The stronger the connection of the foreign court with the parties and
the subject matter of the dispute, the stronger the argument against intervention.” 339 Ultimately, the court retains the discretion to grant an ASI.340 More
specifically on AASI, the judge added that the less that an English AASI
would interfere with foreign proceedings, the more likely that the court would
exercise its discretion. 341
Compared with the test applied by the Ninth Circuit, the English test focuses more heavily on the second and third stages of the analysis: vexation
and comity. 342 Although the disposition issue is not officially a component of
the test, the English court did make a similar analysis of it in this case. 343 The

333.
IPCom GmbH & Co. v. Lenovo Tech. Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 (Eng.).
334.
Id. at [20]. This remark is puzzling since an AASI usually will not prohibit the original proceeding in the foreign court but to fend off the encroachment of the local court’s jurisdiction. This point however has not been further explained by the court.
335.
See id. at [21].
336.
Id.
337.
Id.
338.
Id.
339.
Id.
340.
Id.
341.
See id. at [24].
342.
The tests on ASIs by the two countries clearly share a lot of similarities. See
HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 279.
343.
IPCom, [2019] EWHC at [46].
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court pointed out that the U.S. and English proceedings did not overlap. The
U.S. proceedings were brought by the U.S. companies and dealt with the settlement of a global FRAND license and the two U.S. patents. The English
proceedings, however, were against the UK companies and were only concerned with the infringement and validity of the UK designation of a European patent. 344 In addition, since the AASI sought by IPCom was only to prohibit the UK companies from assisting the U.S. ASI against the UK
proceedings, 345 it would not even prevent the U.S. companies from continuing the ASI in the U.S. courts or initiating substantive proceedings there.
Thus, the interference with foreign proceedings was much less than a usual
AASI. 346 However, this distinction is still rather technical, following the
aged-old argument that the ASI is in personam, 347 and puts much less weight
on the fact that the UK and U.S. companies are functionally the same parties
as under the U.S. ASI test. 348
On the vexation issue, the court thought that the English court was “very
clearly” the natural forum, considering that the patent was an English one,
and its validity could only be decided by the English court. 349 Should the ASI
prevail, no court in the world, including the U.S. court, could decide that issue. 350 This “only court” argument is invariably present in all AASI decisions
below. Another core argument made here is that the local patent infringement
proceeding is justified as a means to prevent “holding out” by the implementer: “[t]he only realistic means a patentee of a standard essential patent
has to move things forward is to bring an action for infringement. . . . If the
present action were to be brought to a halt, that means of bringing pressure
would vanish together.” 351 Depriving this right to litigate infringement in
England would therefore be vexatious and oppressive to IPCom. 352 This extends to the UK companies even if their role was only to assist and sanction
the U.S. ASI. 353 Accordingly, even though the English acknowledged that
both parties were content to have the U.S. court to settle the FRAND term,
English court was clearly the more appropriate forum. 354
On comity, apart from reiterating the limited interference to the U.S. proceedings highlighted above, the court specifically addressed Lenovo’s argument that the English court should leave the U.S. court to reject the ASI. The
judge believed that there was a risk that the U.S. court would assume that the
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id.
See id. at [15].
See id. at [47].
See id. at [23].
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2012).
See IPCom, [2019] EWHC at [48].
Id. at [49].
Id. at [51].
See id. at [52].
See id. at [53].
See id. at [48].
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UK companies were allowed to sanction the U.S. companies’ ASI motion.
Granting the AASI here would thus eliminate the risk. However, commentators have often argued that courts, in considering whether to issue an ASI,
should not do so where the foreign court could have declined jurisdiction itself by forum non conveniens. “If the foreign court has not yet considered the
question [of forum non conveniens], it is hard to see the justification for preempting its decision with an injunction.” 355 This would preserve comity. By
analogy, given that the U.S. court has yet to rule on the ASI motion, it will be
in the interest of comity to take that “risk” and trust the U.S. court in making
the right decision. The choice to intervene anyway shows that, at least in
FRAND litigations, national interest trumps the elusive comity consideration
for the English court. Finally, the court did not find the fact that the U.S. court
was the first seized court to be significant. 356
Turning to the question of the lack of ASIs issued by the English court in
FRAND litigations, it may be attributed to four reasons: (1) the English ASI
test is more stringent in certain aspects; (2) the view of the English court in
setting global FRAND rates; (3) restriction on ASIs issued by the English
court against EU member states pursuant to the Brussels Recast Regulation;
and (4) the lack of emphasis on public (or national) interest by the English
court in private international law.
As highlighted above, the finding of vexation requires the English court
to be the natural forum. 357 This is, however, not a requirement under either
U.S. or Chinese law on ASIs. For example, in Samsung, neither company was
based in China. 358 While the case certainly involves Chinese patents, Samsung’s underlying request was, however, to set global FRAND rates. 359 If the
Chinese patents do not account for a substantive share of the SEP portfolio in
question, China may not be the natural forum to the case. Although the UKSC
confirmed in Unwired that it could set a global FRAND rate, 360 it did not
consider foreign proceedings regarding the validity of foreign patents and the
rate setting as being mutually exclusive. In that case, the UKSC approved that
the proposed formula for the global rate can always include a contingency in
which some patents would subsequently be found invalid or not essential. 361

355.
See Hartley, supra note 67, at 507; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 19, at 323 (proposing such rule in an international convention).
356.
See IPCom, [2019] EWHC at [57].
357.
See id. at [21].
358.
Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, E 01 Zhi
Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
359.
Id.
360.
See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [97] (appeal
taken from Eng.).
361.
Id. at [64] (“If an implementer is concerned about the validity and infringement of
particularly significant patents or a group of patents in a particular jurisdiction which might
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In those cases, the formula would simply adjust the global rate to reflect the
invalid patents. 362 Accordingly, concurrent proceedings of the English global
rate setting and the foreign invalidity suit are certainly acceptable to the English court. In other words, the foreign patent invalidity suit will not generally
be considered vexatious. This aligns with what the U.S. court decided in the
Apple case, and probably the reason why ASIs by the English court against
the concurrent Chinese proceedings on patent validity never came into the
picture. However, this formula does not work against the reverse case, such
as Microsoft, where it was the SEP owner who filed the overseas proceeding
on the basis of patent infringement. This was also the case in Unwired. Apart
from the Chinese proceedings, another concurrent litigation on patent infringement was proceeding in Germany. However, the English court was, at
the time, forbidden from issuing ASIs against fellow EU member states by
the Brussels Recast Regulation. Although there was no such express article
under the Brussels Recast Regulation, the European Court of Justice laid
down such a rule in Turner v. Grovit that “a prohibition imposed by a court,
backed by a penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter court’s jurisdiction to
determine the dispute.” 363 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) insisted that
ASIs against member states would be against the spirit of mutual trust and
harmonization embedded in the Regulation. Thus, it would be impossible for
the English court to enjoin the concurrent German proceedings in Unwired.
Nevertheless, after Brexit, England was no longer bound by the Regulation
and Turner v. Grovit. It is, therefore, more likely for England to issue ASIs
against EU member states in the future.
There is a lack of emphasis on public (or national) interest by English
courts in private international law traditionally. 364 This is not to say that England is immune from pursuing self-interest. Rather, its national interests may
be different from other countries. By technology market share, England certainly trails behind China and the United States. Its interest in setting a global
rate may have more to do with its status as an international dispute center. 365
have a significant effect on the royalties which it would have to pay, it might in our view be fair
and reasonable for the implementer to reserve the right to challenge those patents or a sample
of those patents in the relevant foreign court and to require that the licence provide a mechanism
to alter the royalty rates as a result. It might also be fair and reasonable for the implementer to
seek to include in the licence an entitlement to recover sums paid as royalties attributable to
those patents in the event that the relevant foreign court held them to be invalid or not infringed
. . . .”).
362.
Id.
363.
Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, ECLI:EU:C:2004:228, ¶ 27 (Apr. 27, 2004).
364.
Richard Fentiman, Anti-Suit Injunction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 81 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
365.
See RICHARD FENTIMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 8 (2nd ed.
2010) (“The [English] Commercial Court, established to adjudicate ‘any claim arising out of
the transaction of trade and commerce’, is regarded by litigants, and by the court itself, as an
international not local tribunal. Consistently, a majority of disputes initiated concern at least
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While that might still give England an interest to issue ASIs, this interest
might not be as strong as that of China or the United States in their respective
quests to lead the technology market. 366
In the end, the English court entertained issuing an ASI in a past FRAND
case. In Unwired v. Huawei, Unwired asked the court to enjoin Huawei’s proceeding in China after the English court ruled previously that Huawei infringed certain Unwired’s SEPs over wireless telecommunications standards. 367 The substance of the application was compromised before the court
could rule on whether to grant the ASI. 368 However, the English court indicated that if there were no such compromise, it would have granted an
AASI. 369 Should this happen in the future, England may join China and the
United States as an aggressor in the first group.

D. France
In the dispute between Lenovo and IPCom, the French Court of Appeals
also issued an AASI against the ASI application in the United States. 370 However, despite certain similarities, the bases of the French AASI were different
from those of the English AASI.
Since ASIs are a common law product, it is surprising that the French
court would issue an AASI. Generally, civil law countries find ASIs offensive, or even against international law. 371 Also, as elaborated in Part II above,
AASIs are fundamentally different from ASIs, in that the former aims to protect the local court’s jurisdiction while preserving the underlying proceedings
in the foreign court, but the purpose of the latter is to stop foreign court(s)
from adjudicating the case. 372 This forms the basis of the French court’s decision in Lenovo v. IPCom.
The background of the U.S. ASI was set out above. Apart from seeking
an AASI from the English court, IPCom also sought an AASI from the French
court. 373 The Paris Court of First Instance granted an AASI against the U.S.
one party which is not English, of which many are disputes involving two foreign parties.”); see
also Jane Croft, London Cements Position as Hub for Telecoms Patent Disputes, FIN. TIMES
(June 16, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/af93f7c8-c291-41d3-8d4c-b45c55b61d75.
366.
Maintaining an image of neutrality is also important. See Fentiman, supra note 364,
at 81 (stating that some “legal systems seek only to vindicate the private rights of the parties to
the exclusion of other considerations, an approach followed . . . in England”).
367.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2831 (Eng.) at
[5]–[7].
368.
Id. at [1].
369.
Id. at [13].
370.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426 (Fr.).
371.
See, e.g., Contreras & Eixenberger, supra note 1, at 455; see also Case C-159/02,
Turner v. Grovit, ECLI:EU:C:2004:228 (Apr. 27, 2004). Importantly, none of the justices sitting
in that case came from common law jurisdictions. Id.
372.
See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
373.
See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426, paras. 11–13 (Fr.).
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companies of Lenovo, ordering them to withdraw their ASI motion from the
U.S. court as it relates to IPCom’s infringement action in France regarding
the French part of a European patent against the Lenovo entities. 374 In addition, the AASI had a worldwide effect and prohibited U.S. companies from
filing new ASI proceedings before any foreign court. 375 Violation of the
AASI will subject Lenovo to a penalty of EUR 200,000 per infringement and
for each day’s delay of compliance from the date of issue of the judgment. 376
This AASI happened to be issued on the same day as the English AASI. 377
The U.S. companies withdrew their U.S. ASI motion regarding the French
proceedings accordingly but appealed the first-instance decision to the Paris
Court of Appeal, which by then had the full benefit of reading the English
judgment. 378 In addition, the Paris Court of First Instance, in a subsequent
order, rejected IPCom’s application for a provisional ban, as it considered the
measures of prohibition, recall, and confiscation disproportionate in light of
the soon-to-be expired patent in question. 379
With no ASI rules in its legal system, the Paris Court of Appeals resorted
to Article 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This article allows the president
of the Court of First Instance to order interim protective measures or restoration measures to put an end to a manifestly unlawful disturbance. 380 The language of the article resembles Article 100 of Chinese Civil Procedure Law.381
Given the earlier date of the French judgment, it is possible that the SPC used
Article 835 as a reference before deciding to make use of Article 100 in
Huawei II. 382 Despite the different legal bases, the French court still considered the same three core issues.
On the disposition issue, the French court found the U.S. and French actions to be distinct. 383 The U.S. action concerned the contractual liability for
breaching the FRAND commitment and the setting of the global FRAND
rate. 384 “[I]t does not relate to the infringement of the patent in dispute and
. . . the outcome of the infringement action in France is not [of] interest [to]

374.
Id. at para. 13.
375.
Id.
376.
Id.
377.
See id. at para. 14. Though it does not appear that either court had a chance to look
at each other’s judgment before releasing their own. See IPCom GmbH & Co. v. Lenovo Tech.
Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 [19] (Eng.).
378.
See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426, paras. 11–14 (Fr.).
379.
See id. at para. 20.
380.
See id. at para. 51.
381.
See supra note 244.
382.
The SPC, however, never cited the French judgment nor the French Civil Procedure
Code. See Huawei II, supra note 247.
383.
See id. at para. 59.
384.
Id. at para. 7.
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the California judge . . . .” 385 Following the English approach, 386 this strict
characterization of the matters into two categories of “contract” and “patent”
is clearly more stringent than the disposition test under U.S. law. 387
While employing the term “manifestly unlawful disturbance,”388 the factors considered by the French court are similar to those discussed under the
vexation issue by the English court. Like the English court, the French court
highlighted the rights of SEP owners given by the French patent. The Paris
Court of Appeals explained that without the AASI, IPCom would be deprived
of its SEP in France. 389 Most notably, there was the “only court” factor: “[the
U.S. ASI] infringes the right for the holder of an industrial patent to access
the only judge competent to rule on the infringement of its title.” 390 However,
the court went beyond just the right derived from the patent pursuant to the
French Intellectual Property Code, and also regarded the U.S. ASI as an infringement of the owner’s human right pursuant to the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). 391 Not only is peaceful enjoyment of one’s possession guaranteed under the ECHR, 392 but it is also one’s litigation right:
“everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 393
In evaluating comity, 394 by highlighting that the French action was distinct from the U.S. action, the court utilized the same argument as the English
court that the U.S. substantive proceedings would continue without being affected by the AASI. 395 Following the English court, the French court also
tried to limit the unnecessary worldwide effect of the AASI. It reversed the
first-instance order to prohibit Lenovo from filing any new applications for
ASIs, as it considered the mere possibility of such a new motion as insufficient to constitute a manifestly unlawful disturbance.396
However, the French certainly went above and beyond the comity consideration of the English court. The court took time to address the “temporary

385.
Id. at para. 59.
386.
See supra text accompanying note 343.
387.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
388.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426, at paras.
57, 59 (Fr.).
389.
Id. at para. 4.
390.
Id. at para. 57.
391.
Id.
392.
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S.
No. 9.
393.
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
394.
It is noted that the comity doctrine is not generally used in civil law jurisdictions. See
Horatia Muir Watt & Tim W. Dornis, Comity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 383, 384 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017). However, courts still engage in the analysis
of possible impact to international relations. The label used here is just for convenience.
395.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426, para. 59
(Fr.).
396.
Id. at para. 61.
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suspension” argument often raised by U.S. and Chinese courts in justifying
the limited impact on comity by ASIs:
If the Lenovo companies maintain that this prohibiting measure is
only temporary and only lasts for the time of the proceedings before
the American judge, such a stay, having regard to the duration
thereof which might take several years, but also of its uncertain outcome, compared to the limited duration of protection granted to the
owner of a patent, . . . [it] amounts to a concrete deprivation of the
right for its holder . . . . 397
The potentially long suspension and limited term of the patent did not sit well
with the French judges. Their view on comity, or the lack thereof, is also
reflected in the court’s clear assertion of the territorial interest of the French
court on the matter, emphasizing that “the Californian judge . . . could not . . .
rule on such an action for infringement which is of the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Paris Court of First Instance.” 398 Consequently, the AASI is the “only
appropriate way to put an end to the manifestly unlawful disturbance” that
the U.S. ASI has caused. 399
In sum, despite the French AASI arising from the same U.S. ASI as the
English AASI, the French court apparently considered the U.S. ASI a more
damning encroachment on its territorial jurisdiction (instead of simply calling
French court the natural forum) and on the rights of the SEP owner (not only
intellectual property rights but also human rights enshrined in the ECHR).
The ultimate order was also more severe than the English AASI, given that
the U.S. court had already terminated the ASI application by the time the case
reached the Paris Court of Appeals. The imminence of the U.S. ASI threat
was therefore non-existent when the English court issued its AASI. This contrast between approaches is particularly interesting considering that the English court is also subject to the ECHR. Ultimately, this may again be explained
by national interest, though not in FRAND suits, but in international litigation. As the original inventor of ASIs, English courts view ASIs as legitimate
tools at the disposal of the court, although the use of caution is required. The
French position, however, is against ASIs, not just in FRAND suits but also
in general. 400

E. Germany
The German court is even more hostile to ASIs. To date, the German
court has issued the greatest number of AASIs in the world, in at least three

397.
398.
399.
400.

Id. at para. 58.
Id.
Id. at para. 59.
There is an exception on exclusive forum selection clause, to be discussed in Part V.
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such cases. 401 It also has the misfortune of being the country with the most
judgments enjoined by foreign ASIs, as seen in Microsoft (by a U.S. court)
and Huawei II (by a Chinese court). 402
In Nokia v. Continental (Nokia I), Continental sought an ASI in the
Northern District of California in the United States to enjoin Nokia from filing a patent infringement suit against Daimler, a German car manufacturer
and a Continental customer in Germany. 403 Nokia countered by asking the
Regional Court of Munich I to issue an AASI. 404 The court granted the AASI
in July 2019 and held that the ASI granted in the United States constituted an
interference with Nokia’s property under German law. 405 This was the
world’s first AASI ever issued on FRAND disputes, 406 and was subsequently
upheld by the Higher Regional Court of Munich (HRCM). 407
Like France, Germany has no ASIs in its legal system, so it must analyze
AASI on another legal basis. While the French courts based the AASI on its
civil procedure rule, 408 no such rule exists under German civil procedure. 409
Thus, the German courts had to rely on substantive law to issue the AASI.410
They considered the foreign ASI to be a tort. 411 “In this specific case, the
encroachment upon Applicant’s patent rights under tort law associated with
the issuance of an [ASI] (which is presently imminent and therefore justifies
a preventive claim for injunction with the scope of Sec. 1004(1) BGB) is unlawful.” 412 Once again, despite this different basis, the major considerations
can still be analyzed under the three issues.
401.
See supra Table 1.
402.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012);
Huawei II, supra note 247.
403.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333/19
(Ger.).
404.
Id.
405.
Id.
406.
See Greta Niehaus, First Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction in Germany: The Costs for
International Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2021), http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2021/02/28/first-anti-anti-suit-injunction-in-germany-the-costs-for-international-arbitration.
407.
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich]
Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5689/19 (Ger.).
408.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426, para. 60
(Fr.).
409.
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich]
Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, ¶ B(2) (Ger.) (“A judicial power to deny a party the right to conduct
proceedings comparable to the one under Anglo-Saxon law does not exist in German procedural
law.”).
410.
In the Nokia case, the court applied § 823(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB) in
conjunction with § 1004(1) BGB and held that the possibility of an ASI by a U.S. court constitutes a hindrance to the patentee’s exercise of (quasi-)property patent rights. Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333/19, ¶ 21 (Ger.).
411.
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich]
Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, ¶ B(2) (Ger.).
412.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b).
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On the disposition issue, the HRCM regards the U.S. action on FRAND
licensing and the German action on patent infringement as “not identical.” 413
The U.S. action was also conducted between different parties. 414 Thus, the
German approach to this issue, like the French approach above, is stricter than
that of the United States. 415 However, the HRCM went beyond that distinction. Addressing the respondents’ argument that the U.S. licensing suit was
conducted based on the use of the Applicants’ patent, the HRCM stated that
“it is not clear why a FRAND licensing defense would not be able to be asserted in the infringement proceedings in Germany, which were pending prior
to the main proceedings in the United States and in which two Continental
group companies are involved as interveners.” 416 This statement highlights
the major difference between jurisdictions that allow ASIs and those that do
not. For the latter, even if there are identical issues, it still does not justify the
former issuing the ASI against the latter’s proceedings. The German court
does not therefore need to make a technical distinction between the foreign
and local proceedings, as the U.S. court did in Samsung. 417
On the vexation issue, like the French court, the HRCM placed greater
emphasis on the deprivation of patent rights calling it an “absolute right” of
Nokia. 418 The encroachment of such patent rights was therefore unlawful. 419
However, the court did not stop there. It saw the AASI as a self-defense measure that is justified for the assertion of the Applicants’ constitutional rights,
which in turn, arise from their property rights and right to access to justice. 420
While these rights were also relied on by the French court in IPCom, the
French court cited the ECHR as the source of this right, while the German
court deemed the rights to derive from the German constitution.
On the comity issue, the German court discussed this in the context of
whether the AASI would be a violation of international law. To the HRCM,
there was no violation of international law, and the AASI was seen as an implementation of the principle of territoriality. 421 From this angle, the U.S. ASI
was an encroachment against German patent rights, clearly a right under the
exclusive jurisdiction of Germany. The AASI, as a self-defense measure, was
entirely legitimate. To the extent that there were any “reflex-like extraterritorial effects” in the United States caused by the AASI, they are “legitimized
413.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b)(bb)(1).
414.
Id.
415.
See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426, paras. 59–60 (Fr.).
416.
See Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich] Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, ¶ B(3)(b)(bb)(1) (Ger.).
417.
See supra text accompanying notes 284–89.
418.
See Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich] Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, ¶ B(2)(a) (Ger.).
419.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b).
420.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b)(aa).
421.
Id. ¶ B(4).

362

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 28:305

by [the need for self-defense] and do not constitute an interference with the
sovereign rights of the United States.” 422 The court further added that international law is subordinated to federal law.
Alternatively, given that the court based the AASI on protecting constitutional rights, as discussed above, it believed the assessment of international
law was not called for. 423 Further, as if responding to the temporary suspension argument of the U.S. court in Microsoft, the HRCM repeatedly stated
that applicants should not be made to wait for the assertion of their patent
rights: 424 “[a]pplicants could not be denied the option of continuing to pursue
their patent infringement suits in Germany without disturbance and without
having to wait for the result of the U.S. main proceedings.” 425
Having considered the above, the court concluded that the AASI was the
“only effective means of defense against an [ASI].” 426 Also, any non-compliance of the AASI comes with not only fines (up to EUR 250,000,000) for
each case of violation but also, in the alternative, detention for up to six
months (two years for repeated violation) for the Chairman of the respondent’s board of directors. 427 This is certainly a very effective means to ensure
compliance. Compare this with the English law, where violating an injunction
order would be contempt of court and could lead to criminal sanction as well
but would always be subject to the court’s discretion. 428
On appeal, the HRCM in Nokia II repeated its reasoning in Nokia I concerning the tortious interference with the patentee’s (quasi-)property rights. 429
Additionally, the court explained the defensive nature of the AASI, which is
viewed as the legitimate exercise of patent right. 430
The opposition of the German court to foreign ASIs was reinforced in the
subsequent case of InterDigital Technology Corp. v. Xiaomi Communications
Co. (InterDigital), 431 a case that corresponds with the worldwide ASI issued
by the Wuhan Court in Xiaomi. 432 Apart from applying and elaborating on the
principles discussed in Nokia II, the Regional Court of Munich I developed
new principles in response to the worldwide effect of the Chinese ASI.
422.
Id.
423.
Id.
424.
Id. ¶¶ B(2)(a), B(3)(b)(aa).
425.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b)(aa).
426.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b)(bb)(1).
427.
Nokia v. Continental [LG München] Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court
Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333/19 (Ger.).
428.
See Fentiman, supra note 364, at 82.
429.
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich]
Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, ¶ B(3)(b) (Ger.).
430.
Id. ¶ B(3)(b)(aa).
431.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20,
¶ F(I)(1) (Ger.).
432.
Xiaomi Tongxun Jishu Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Gongsi (ሿ㊣䙊䇟ᢰᵟޜਨ䇹Ӕӂ
ᮠᆇޜਨ) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Holdings, Inc.], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No.
431 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 23, 2020) (China).
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In connection with the three issues, the court highlighted that the Chinese
proceedings were only on the determination of global FRAND rates. Their
outcome would not result in a license that prevented Xiaomi from violating
InterDigital’s German patent. 433 The court further commented that the pending Chinese judgment on global rates was not expected to be recognized in
Germany, either. This is because the Chinese court lacked proper international jurisdiction under German law for assuming jurisdiction over InterDigital entities, which are all domiciled in the United States. 434 On the vexation
issue, in line with the HRCM, the court viewed the Chinese ASI as impairing
the property right of InterDigital, which then gave InterDigital a right of selfdefense in the form of an AASI. 435 If InterDigital is prohibited by the ASI
from applying for injunctive relief, which the court called “the sharpest
weapon of the patent proprietor,” 436 it would render the patent right worthless. 437 Additionally, like the HRCM in Nokia II, the court also considered
the ASI a violation of the right of access to the courts, though it also referred
to the ECHR for the source of such rights, as the French court did in IPCom. 438 On comity, apart from the now standard argument that the AASI
would not affect the main proceedings in China, the court implicitly criticized
that the Chinese ASI was unjust. After stating that the Chinese ASI was unlawful under German law and that an AASI was necessary to counter the Chinese ASI, the court remarked that “[i]t must be taken into account that justice
does not have to and may not bow to injustice.” 439
The biggest development from the case came from the courts’ inclusion
of an AAAASI in the order. This is to preempt that a foreign court may issue
an AAASI prohibiting the seeking of AASI by the SEP owner. 440 It should be
noted that the Chinese ASI in question did not contain an AAASI. However,
before the German court’s decision in Xiaomi, the Chinese court had already
issued an AAASI in Samsung v. Ericsson. 441 The AAAASI in this case could
therefore be seen as the German court entering into an arm race with the Chinese court in FRAND litigations. Thus, the FRAND ping-pong ball has now
been bounced to the court of China again.
In addition, the German court also made sure that both the AASI and the
AAAASI could be triggered quickly. In Nokia II, the AASI was granted at
433.
See Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276
/20, ¶ C(I)(2) (Ger.).
434.
Id.
435.
Id. ¶ D(I).
436.
Id. ¶ E(I).
437.
Id.
438.
Id. ¶ E(II)(d)(ee).
439.
Id. ¶ E(III)(1).
440.
Id. ¶ E(II)(d)(aa).
441.
Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
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the filing of the application of the U.S. ASI, which was perceived as the threat
of first infringement. 442 This was formalized by the court in Xiaomi. The court
declared that it would “always assume the existence of the required risk of a
first infringement” 443 in some scenarios, including as early as the SEP user
threatening to request an ASI, and even the threatening to file a main action
(whether for the grant of a license or determination of global rates) in a jurisdiction that generally provides ASIs. In the latter case, such jurisdiction
clearly includes China and the United States. Furthermore, even the threat of
the standard implementer filing an ASI against other SEP owners could trigger the German AASI. 444 Thus, from now onwards, a standard implementer
threatening an ASI anywhere in the world against any SEP owner may expect
the possibility of receiving a German AASI and AAAASI. Finally, the German court also considered a standard implementer’s failure to affirmatively
declare that it will not file an ASI application as a risk of first infringement
under certain conditions. For example, when the SEP owner serves the standard implementer with the first infringer’s notice, if no such declaration is
made within a short time limit, the standard implementer may be considered
to have created a risk of first infringement. This hands a powerful weapon to
SEP owners in their defense against potential ASIs in FRAND negotiations. 445
By setting such a broad base of scenarios to trigger the filing of AASI,
the German court has effectively granted a worldwide AASI in relation to any
future ASI against a German patent infringement suit. Of course, the request
for the AASI may not, in the end, be granted by the German court, but this
should be a powerful deterrent against ASIs relating to German suits. This
response by the German court is certainly very robust, to say the least, but it
is also understandable if one takes a holistic view of the history of how German courts have been involved in SEP litigations. Germany has been denied
the ability to enforce two judgments on German patents by ASIs from the
United States and China. Its proceeding in Oppo was also clearly interrupted
by a Chinese ASI, not to mention the two cases above. While the ASI litigation in IPCom did not occur in German court, IPCom is incorporated in Germany and one would expect it is in the interest of the German courts to protect
its companies. 446 This combined with its traditional antagonism towards ASIs

442.
See Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Oct. 2, 2019, 21 O 9333
/19 (Ger.).
443.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20,
¶ E(II)(d)(aa) (Ger.).
444.
See id. ¶ E(I).
445.
Id. ¶ E(II)(3)(d)(cc)(2).
446.
This case detailed the difficulty of serving judicial documents to Xiaomi through the
Chinese authority through the Hague Service Convention, even calling the uncooperative practice of the Chinese authority as “a complete denial of legal assistance.” See id. ¶ B(III)(2)(b).
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(having previously refused service of English ASIs)447 and its designation of
constitutional rights being at stake in ASI cases, Germany is expected to have
rather drastic developments in AASI.
In addition, although it is possible that the German court may set global
FRAND rates like courts in England, the United States, and China, 448 it has
less of an interest in doing so. Germany certainly does not have a technology
market as large as the United States and China, or a litigation market comparable to England, and is thus less motivated to fight for a monopoly of its
standard and depart from its long-held opposition to ASIs. As we have seen
in the discussion of HCRM, its focus has been on its territoriality and the
defense of German patent rights.

F. India
Despite inheriting its legal system from England, India’s AASI position
is surprisingly close to the more protective stance adopted by France and Germany, as demonstrated by the Indian case of InterDigital. 449 This case involved Ericsson seeking another AASI from the High Court of Delhi against
the Chinese ASI. 450 The Indian court first granted an ad interim injunction, 451
which was subsequently made absolute by the same court. 452 In between the
orders of the Indian court, the German court issued the AASI and AAAASI
discussed above. 453 Being the latest case on ASIs to date, the Indian court had
the benefit of considering the precedents decided by other courts in InterDigital. It reviewed many of these precedents (including Microsoft decided by
the U.S. court 454 and the IPCom judgments decided by English and French

447.
See Re the Enforcement of an English Anti‐suit Injunction, Oberlandegreicht Düsseldorf [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf] [1997] I.L. Pr. 320 (Ger.).
448.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [68–79] (appeal
taken from Eng.); Oppo, supra note 111.
449.
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889 (India).
450.
The court characterized the injunction against the Chinese ASI as an anti-enforcement injunction. This is because in the court’s definition, AASI only refers to injunction against
ASI that is still in process in foreign court. With the ASI in question having already been issued
by the Chinese court, the court thought it would be appropriate to refer it to anti-enforcement
injunction instead. However, to maintain consistency in this article, we still refer to the antienforcement injunction in this case as AASI. The distinction made by the Indian court is noted.
See id. at paras. 76–80.
451.
The ad interim order is not binding when the application will be taken up final hearing. See id. at para. 3.
452.
See id. at para. 119(i).
453.
Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20
(Ger.).
454.
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889, paras. 69–75 (India).

366

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 28:305

courts 455) in aid of its decision to issue an AASI in the FRAND suit, which
was the first of its kind in India. 456
As private international law of India has been heavily influenced by that
of England, 457 it is unsurprising that Indian law on ASIs (in this case, AASIs)
is substantially similar to English law. Like English law, the “pre-eminent
test” on ASIs under Indian law is “whether the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive.” 458 For our purposes, we will again break down the very
detailed reasoning of the court into three issues.
On the disposition issue, like courts in England, France, and Germany
did previously, the Indian court distinguished the Indian proceedings from the
Chinese proceedings, with the former handling the infringement of six Indian
patents and the latter handling the setting of global FRAND rates of the entire
portfolio of SEPs held by Ericsson. 459 Although the court acknowledged that
there was some overlap between the two proceedings (namely, the Indian
court setting Indian FRAND rates), the court did not believe that such overlap
would constitute an interference with the Chinese proceedings justifying the
Wuhan court’s ASI, since it would not be foreseeable that the Indian court
would set global rates in the Indian proceedings. 460 A fortiori, it follows that
the potential for conflicting judgments could not be a justification for refraining from issuing an AASI either. 461
On vexation, like the U.S. court in Huawei I, the Indian court was critical
of the lack of due process in the ex parte application for the Chinese ASI.462
On the patent right, the court said the Chinese court “completely overlooked”
the territorial nature of patent rights. 463 It also deployed the “only court” argument, like all the AASI-issuing courts discussed previously, holding that
the infringement claim on Indian patents can be prosecuted “only before this

455.
Id. at paras. 33–41 (discussing IPCom GmbH & Co., KG v. Lenovo Tech. Ltd. [2019]
EWHC (Pat) 3030 (Eng.) and Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 3, 2020,
19/21426 (Fr.)). The court cited both cases again for support in its final conclusion. Id. at para.
109. Interestingly, the court never discussed the AASI issued by the German court in Landgericht München I [LG] [regional court Munich I] Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20 (Ger.) even though
the approach of the German court is directly relevant to this case. In contrast, the German court
did make reference to the ad interim order made by the Indian court. Id. ¶ C(I)(3).
456.
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889, para. 82 (India).
457.
Tushar Kumar Biswas, India, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
2156, 2157–58 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
458.
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889, para. 81 (India) (internal
quotation omitted).
459.
See id. at para. 99.
460.
See id. at para. 100–01.
461.
See id. at para. 104.
462.
See id. at para. 94.1 (“No decision, permitting this, has been brough to my notice.”).
The judge also criticized Xiaomi for its failure to pass him the information of the Chinese proceedings. He considered that a fraud on the court and thought that standing alone could justify
the AASI. See id. at para 114.
463.
See id. at para. 100.
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Court, and before no other court, least of all before the Wuhan Court.” 464 Preventing the only court with proper jurisdiction from ruling on infringement is
therefore “prima facie oppressive.” 465 Although the court did not cite the
HRCM judgment, the court similarly linked foreign ASIs to the encroachment of litigation rights protected by the Indian constitution, which guarantees “justice, social economic and political.” 466 On comity, the court rejected
the temporary suspension justification that has often been utilized by the U.S.
and Chinese courts, 467 calling the argument “disingenuous”:
[I]t is totally unthinkable that a forum which has no jurisdiction in
[patent infringement] could [enjoin] the plaintiffs from agitating the
issue before the only forum which has [jurisdiction]. Such [an] injunction cannot be allowed even for a single day. That apart, it is
common knowledge – which is why I characterize the contention as
disingenuous – that, in intellectual property infringement claims,
what matters is injunction of the exploitation of the infringing patents
. . . . What the defendants suggest is, therefore, that the plaintiffs
should sit back and helplessly watch continued infringement of their
suit patents by the defendants (as the plaintiffs would allege) without
being able to lift a finger to prevent it, even while legal remedies, for
redressal, continue to remain available in this country under the Patents Act. 468
In addition, following the court’s distinction between the Chinese and
Indian proceedings, the AASI would not enjoin the main proceedings in
China. Further, the Court argued the ASI infringed on rights guaranteed by
the Indian Constitution, guarantees that “cannot be sacrificed at the altar of
comity.” 469 This is similar to HRCM’s reasoning in Nokia II, though the German court discussed the right in terms of international law rather than comity. 470 Similar to the German court, the Indian court also directly referred to
ASIs being an infringement of the sovereignty of India instead of the more
mild terminology of territoriality. 471 Due to the above, the court concluded
that the ASI was “ex facie destructive of the principle of comity of courts
[and] . . . cannot be tolerated even for a day.”472 Acknowledging that the Indian court had no power to stop the penalty imposed by the Wuhan court for

464.
Id. at para. 106; see also id. at paras. 100, 107, 110.
465.
See id. at para. 106.
466.
See id. at para. 112.
467.
See id. at para. 109 for criticism of Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872
(9th Cir. 2012).
468.
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889, para. 107 (India).
469.
Id. at para. 112.
470.
See supra text accompanying note 423.
471.
See InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., 2021 DEL 889, para. 104 (India).
472.
Id. at para. 110.
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violating the ASI, the court therefore designed a similar mechanism to the
indemnification clause of the Huawei II case. 473
Since the Wuhan court already contained a more detailed reconsideration
judgment at the time of Indian proceedings,474 the Indian court could analyze
the Chinese judgment in much more detail than the German court did. The
court was clearly much more critical of the foreign ASI than the English court
was in IPCom, which is understandable given that the U.S. court did not issue
an ASI at the time of the English proceedings. Overall, while Indian law on
ASIs belongs to the common law family, the Indian’s court stance is much
closer that of the French and German courts. This can be attributed to their
similar national interests where FRAND-encumbered SEPs are concerned.
There is a strong desire to protect their own turf with a much lower ambition
to monopolize the FRAND standard than China and the United States.

G. Macro Perspective on SEP-Related ASIs
Taking a bird’s-eye view of the antisuit conflict between Xiaomi and Ericsson, we can attribute the multiple AASIs sought by Ericsson as a response
to the worldwide ASI issued by the Wuhan court. Ericsson probably filed the
patent infringement suit and the first AASI in India because it constituted one
of Xiaomi’s largest overseas markets. 475 Subsequent to the worldwide ASI
from China, it then became possible to file for an AASI in Germany, even
before a German proceeding on infringement had been filed. 476 Thus, we see
one effort at gamesmanship followed by another. 477 Of course, one can also
argue that the worldwide ASI was prompted by the patent owners’ gamesmanship in the first place, when they filed patent infringements in multiple
jurisdictions, as in the case of Apple. It is therefore clear that the question is
not to ask which country is more blameworthy in playing this game but rather
to see if there is a way to eliminate the game altogether.
In summary, despite the difference in legal traditions among the six jurisdictions, they all consider the three issues: disposition, vexations and comity. Whenever a court considers an order that will disrupt a court proceeding
in another country, naturally, it will consider the extent to which the dispute
in front of it is the same as the one in the alternative forum (disposition issue),
the impacts to private parties’ interests (vexation issue) and the alternative

473.
See id. at para. 116.
474.
Sanxing Dianzi Zhushi Huishe (йᱏ⭥ᆀṚᔿՊ⽮䇹⡡・ؑޜਨ) [Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743 (Wuhan Interm.
People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) (China).
475.
See XIAOMI CORP., 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 280 (2020), https://i01.appmifile.com
/webfile/globalweb/company/ir/announcement_us/annual_report_2020_e.pdf (stating that Xiaomi’s overseas revenue was mainly from India and Europe).
476.
See supra text accompanying notes 443–45.
477.
Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 WL 89980, at
*7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
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forum’s interests. Thus, the argument that the conflicting ASIs were caused
by the differences in legal traditions is exaggerated.
There is no question that the different laws and legal traditions still
played a part in the court decisions of jurisdictions in the second group, who
chose not to follow in the footsteps of the United States and China by issuing
ASIs of their own. This is particularly true for France and Germany, civil law
jurisdictions that are wary of ASIs. However, this does not explain why countries such as India, which have common law systems, responded similarly.
Therefore, varying national interests must also play a key role.
The countries in the second group do not have as big a technology market
as the United States or China and therefore may not be as ambitious in expanding their influence on FRAND litigation through the use of ASIs. Given
the inherent conflict between the international nature of FRAND licenses and
the territorial nature of patents, every country, even those without the international ambition of the United States or China, will at least have some interest in protecting their own patents. However, beyond protecting national patent law, they do not consider it wrong for SEP owners to gain leverage
through infringement suits. They also jealously defend their own sovereignty
against encroachment by other jurisdictions through foreign ASIs. However,
their justifications for granting AASI differ. Jurisdictions such as Germany
and India see limitations to access to courts as a violation of constitutional
rights. Germany and France both regard this as a violation of human rights,
and their national interests are more focused on preserving these basic rights
and the countries’ sovereignties. England does not adopt such strong justifications, perhaps because of its long tradition of issuing ASIs. In fact, there is
a good chance that England will move into the first group in the future.
In any event, the overall resentment against ASIs is loud and clear. This
serves as a backlash to the comity analyses of both U.S. and Chinese courts,
where they regard the impact on comity as tolerable in successful ASI applications. If anything, this corroborates that the comity assessed in ASI proceedings is a different concept from Huber’s comity. 478 The former is part of
a unilateral balancing exercise. If the local interests of issuing the ASI are
stronger than the costs on comity (i.e., the damages to good relationships with
foreign jurisdictions), then the courts will grant the ASI. Hence, if ASIs serve
as a kind of barometer of a country’s national interests on FRAND disputes,
then the large number of ASIs issued by the U.S. and Chinese courts confirm
the vast economic interests at stake for the two countries.

478.

See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
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V. SUGGESTED SOLUTION
A. Problem Identification
The international proliferation of ASIs and AASIs and the contradictions
between them have seriously undermined FRAND terms’ goal of fostering
economic efficiency based on technical standards. There are three major interrelated problems. First, while the purpose of standard setting is to promote
efficiency and reduce transaction costs 479 and the goal of FRAND licenses is
to encourage the wide adoption of standards, 480 continuous ASIs and subsequent legal proceedings create significant transaction costs, which hinders the
pervasiveness of standard adoption. 481
Without an effective measure to stop abusive use of ASIs, forum shopping is likely to become a common practice in FRAND disputes. SEP holders
and implementers will rush to favorable national courts that provide them
with advantageous FRAND terms. 482 Likewise, countries with more SEP
holders will naturally develop judicial policies favoring these holders, and
those with more standard implementers will understandably do the opposite. 483 In the end, the ASIs and subsequent AASIs, AAASIs, and even
AAAASIs associated with FRAND-encumbered patents result in a costly and

479.
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Antitrust Overreach: Undoing Cooperative Standardization in the Digital Economy, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 163, 205 (2019); Bartlett & Contreras,
supra note 34, at 286; Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583, 598–99
(1998); J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After
Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1863 (2016); Spulber, supra note 34, at 87; see
also Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1080 (“[G]iving the standard-setting organization the right to bargain on behalf of its members would reduce the transaction costs of the negotiation process.”).
480.
See supra text accompanying note 45; see also Sidak, supra note 37, at 3–4
(“[P]rospective [FRAND] licensors (and frequently prospective licensees) participate in an
SSO, which develops ‘agreements containing technical specifications or other criteria,’ promotes ‘efficient resource allocation and production by facilitating interoperability among complementary products,’ and, in general, participates in the advancement of the standard and associated technology within an industry.”).
481.
Cf. Liu, supra note 36, at 675 (“[I]ncreasing [FRAND] litigation worldwide indicates
massive market failure . . . .”).
482.
Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 724–25; see Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 283–86.
483.
Cf. Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 224 (discussing IP arbitrage where
“[n]ations have incentives to adopt higher-protection rules when an already innovative domestic
sector demonstrates a need for stronger rules to enable firms to recoup R&D investments, or
when nations believe that doing so will spur investments and economic development in that
field of innovation. Nations have incentives to adopt lower-protection rules if they are predominantly users or net importers of products of that kind, if they aspire to incentivize investments
in follow-on innovation, or if they believe that a lower-protection rule will induce more investments than a higher-protection rule.”).
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inefficient ping-pong game without a winner, except the lawyers profiting
from the incessant injunctions against foreign proceedings. 484
Second, from the perspective of private international law, injunction conflicts set very bad precedents for ASIs. When used properly, ASIs are the
ultimate weapon against vexatious foreign proceedings, especially when
there is no mechanism for a foreign court to decline jurisdiction or there is
clear evidence that the litigants will not receive a fair proceeding in the foreign court. 485 In these situations, ASIs will have a positive effect in reducing
parallel proceedings and cabining a dispute to its natural forum, though at the
cost of comity. However, what has been witnessed over the increasing instances of conflicting ASIs will outweigh these positive functions. This is
simply a bad development for private international law.
Third, there is a spillover effect on international relations due to the ASI
conflicts. Although courts do not specify in their judgments, it seems that
responses from Germany (AASIs) and China (ASIs) were motivated by being
on the receiving ends of previous ASIs from the U.S. courts. Thus, one should
never assume that an ASI litigation is only an individual incident between
private parties in question. Retaliatory measures could extend to other aspects
of private international law or other fields of law for the encroachment of
other countries’ jurisdiction.
Our solution to these three problems is to end this game of ping-pong.
We argue that to preserve the value of technical standards and FRAND licenses, it is desirable for all stakeholders to wind up this FRAND ping-pong
game. While standards are designed to ensure interoperability between technologies produced by different manufacturers, the current challenge is how
to preserve the value of standards by enabling interoperability between different sovereigns and their legal systems.

B. Exclusive Forum Selection Clause
Given the private-ordering nature of standard setting and FRAND commitment, the best way to address this issue is through private ordering, 486 i.e.,
an exclusive forum selection clause. By including this clause in their IP policies or FRAND documents, SSO can designate the jurisdiction that is home
to the law specified in the choice of law clause, which is the natural forum for
that law. For example, since the IP policy of ETSI has already contained a
484.
In fact, in one recent case, the English court was surprised to learn about the £472,000
legal costs associated with just a one-day application for an ASI with limited evidence and
called the amount an “exorbitant sum.” Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017]
EWHC (Pat) 2831 [22] (Eng.).
485.
See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 302 (commenting on that ASI can constitute “a powerful weapon against bad-faith proceedings”); Hartley, supra note 67, at 510.
486.
Cf. Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 1, at 286–87 (citing various proposals concerning “private ordering solutions to resolve or forestall disputes involving standardessential patents and FRAND licensing”).
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choice law designating French law, the French court shall be designated as
the court with exclusive jurisdiction to settle all FRAND related disputes. 487
Our proposal will not only provide stakeholders with certainty but also help
the designated courts develop professional experiences in adjudicating
FRAND cases according to the laws of their countries. 488 We believe that this
is the most realistic and cost-effective proposal.
To begin, we would like to note that the idea of inserting an exclusive
forum selection clause was also proposed by the UKSC in Unwired:
Those [SSO] policies, which either expressly or by implication provide for the possibility of FRAND worldwide licences when a SEP
owner has a sufficiently large and geographically diverse portfolio
and the implementer is active globally, do not provide for any international tribunal or forum to determine the terms of such licences.
Absent such a tribunal it falls to national courts, before which the
infringement of a national patent is asserted, to determine the terms
of a FRAND licence. The participants in the relevant industry . . .
can devise methods by which the terms of a FRAND licence may be
settled, either by amending the terms of the policies of the relevant
SSOs to provide for an international tribunal or by identifying respected national IP courts or tribunals to which they agree to refer
such a determination. 489
The origin of the problems begins with parallel proceedings in which
more than one court assumes jurisdiction over the FRAND disputes. The solution therefore lies in reducing the occasions of these parallel proceedings.
ASIs were originally designed to achieve this through barring a litigant from
pursuing the same suit in another forum, but as we have shown above, ASIs
have become a problem themselves. The better way to eliminate parallel proceedings is to include an exclusive forum selection clause ex ante. Courts
around the world, including all six jurisdictions discussed in this Article, generally respect the forum choice of the parties when they express it in the form
of the forum selection clause.

487.
However, if an SSO does not contain a choice of law clause in its IP policies, it shall
be free to choose any forum its members think will be the best forum. This shall include but not
limited to the courts at the country where the SSO is based given the diverse membership of
most SSOs.
488.
See also David Wilson & Joanna Silver, Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses and Anti-Suit
Injunctions, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 220, 222 (2010) (“It is beneficial to both IP owners
and licensees to have certainty as to where a dispute will be resolved or litigated, and to know
that all disputes will be brought in the same jurisdiction; indeed, this is the purpose of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.”).
489.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, [90] (appeal taken
from Eng.).
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In the United States, the respect given to forum selection clauses was
stated in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company. 490 The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that a forum selection clause that is “freely negotiated . . ., unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power . . .
should be given full effect.” 491 The rationale is also based on the facilitation
of international business, a national interest rather than an interest in comity:
“[t]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.” 492 Consequently, the Supreme Court stayed the U.S. proceedings in favor of the
English court as designated by the forum selection clause in the case. 493
In reaching this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court was clearly influenced
by the similar approach adopted by other common law jurisdictions, including England. 494 Under English common law, it has long been held that the
English court will generally exercise the discretion to stay the English proceeding when it is initiated in breach of the forum selection clause. This discretion will be exercised “unless strong cause for not doing so is shown.” 495
India, another common law jurisdiction greatly influenced by English private
international law, shares a similar rule. 496 As we discussed in Microsoft
above, a significant justification of the Ninth Circuit’s grant of the ASI was
the analogy of the forum selection clause. 497
Such respect for forum selection by private parties, however, is not restricted to common law jurisdictions. Under Article 25 of the Brussels Regulation, parties, regardless of domicile, may select the court of a member state
of the European Union to have jurisdiction. Further, unlike common law
rules, Article 25 provides a presumption of the exclusiveness of the selection. 498 The Chinese Civil Procedure Law also provides for prorogation jurisdiction under Article 34. 499 The article allows parties to choose a court with
a practical connection with the dispute. This could be easily satisfied in
FRAND disputes if the SSO designates the court of a country, which also has

490.
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
491.
Id. at 12–13.
492.
Id. at 9.
493.
Id. at 2.
494.
Id. at 11.
495.
See Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ship or Vessel Eleftheria v. Eleftheria [1969] 2 WLR 1073.
496.
See Modi Ent. Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 1177 (2003) (India).
497.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012).
498.
See Regulation 1215/2012, art. 25, 2012 O.J. (L 351) (EU), amended by 2014 O.J.
(L 163).
499.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (୰⌵ਕඹᅜ宰宣
ἲ) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 27, 2017, effective July 1, 2017), art. 34.
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its law designated as the governing law, 500 and the selection would be further
cemented if it is also the court of the country where the SSO is located. Although the law did not expressly provide that the Chinese courts must decline
jurisdiction in the face of foreign forum selection clauses, it is the practice of
many Chinese courts to decline jurisdiction in such cases. 501
Commentators have advocated that courts with the power to issue ASIs
shall be slow in triggering such intrusive measures and should allow the foreign courts to decline jurisdiction in the first place through forum non conveniens, should it be available, under the law of the foreign courts. 502 An exclusive forum selection clause can achieve that. Not only would common law
jurisdictions with forum non conveniens decline jurisdiction, civil law jurisdictions would do the same. More importantly, due to the global respect for
forum selection clauses, countries equipped with ASI-issuing power might
trust foreign courts to decline jurisdiction on their own volition, something
we have not seen the courts do in the SEP-related ASI context without such
clauses. This will promote comity or, as mentioned above, respect for a foreign country’s sovereignty.
Some commentators may, however, argue that the national interests
brought by FRAND-encumbered SEPs may be so strong that courts may be
willing to overlook the forum selection clause. 503 While this is a possibility,
it is unlikely for two reasons. First, while ASI practices and acceptance vary
among countries, respect for the forum selection clause has received much
broader acceptance around the world. It is the basis of international commerce: contracting parties will only manage their risks if they know where
the dispute will be resolved. 504 An example of this consensus can be seen in
the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Although it handles enforcement of
judgment and has no direct application here, the jurisdictional basis of the
judgment-rendering court is the forum selection clause. 505 Some countries,
including the United States, China and the European Union, have signed the
convention, though only the European Union has ratified it. 506 Accordingly,
when it comes to an issue so fundamental in international commerce and thus

500.
See Shandong Jufeng Gongsi Su Hanguo MGAME Gongsi (ኡь㚊Ѡ㖁㔌ᴹ䲀ޜ
ਨ䇹丙ഭMGAMEޜਨ) [Shandong Jufeng Network Co. v. MGame Co.], 2010 Sup. People’s
Ct. Gaz. 161 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2009) (China) (implying that one of the practical connections
can be choice of law clause).
501.
See TANG ET AL., supra note 242, at 101.
502.
See supra text accompanying note 352.
503.
For example, it is reported that some Chinese courts do not always respect foreign
forum selection clause. See TANG ET AL., supra note 242, at 101.
504.
See Hartley, supra note 67, at 503–05.
505.
See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 5(1), June 30, 2005, 44
ILM 1294.
506.
See Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last updated Mar. 3,
2021).
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national interest, it is less likely that a court is willing to take a risk here by
bending the rule.
Second, if a court ignores a forum selection clause, the ASI can actually
have a positive effect by barring the party from breaching the forum selection.
In fact, the Microsoft decision is practically based on the FRAND commitment functioning as a type of exclusive forum selection clause. 507 The German infringement suit, therefore, was a breach that merited the U.S. court to
issue an ASI. 508 The English court will also usually grant an ASI against the
breach of the forum selection clause, although it is, in the end, subject to the
discretion of the court. 509 Such an ASI would not offend comity because “it
merely requires a party to honour his contract.” 510 This is also the position of
India. In Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., 511 the Supreme Court of India stated that “[w]here jurisdiction of a court is invoked on
the basis of jurisdiction clause in a contract, the recitals therein in regard to
exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction of the court of choice of the parties
are not determinative but are relevant factors.” 512
For other jurisdictions, apart from knowing that the Chinese court can
issue an ASI very broadly, it is also well known that both Germany and
France can issue ASIs (not AASIs) in the context of a breach of the forum
selection clause. For example, in the aforementioned case, Nokia II, the
HRCM stated that despite German law having no right to deny a party the
right to conduct proceedings generally, one exception is that “a claim to cease
and desist from the conduction of proceedings may result from a preceding
contractual agreement.” 513 Similar ASIs have also been issued by the French
court in the context of a breach of an exclusive forum selection clause, provided that the case falls outside of the scope of the Brussel regime. 514 In summary, ASIs in this context are not only problem-free but also have positive
effects in preventing parallel proceedings. Of course, courts should only issue
ASIs when foreign courts have had the opportunity to decline jurisdiction of
their own volition first.
Compared with other proposals, the inclusion of the exclusive forum selection clause is also the most practical and cost-effective. First, it is hornbook
law that a choice of law clause is best accompanied by a forum selection
507.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2012).
508.
Id. at 889.
509.
See Team Y&R Holdings Hong Kong Ltd. v. Ghossoub [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2401
[42] (Eng.).
510.
IPCom GmbH v. Lenovo Tech. Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 [21] (Eng.).
511.
Modi Ent. Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 1177 (2003) (India).
512.
Id.
513.
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München] [Higher Regional Court of Munich]
Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, ¶ B(2)(Ger.).
514.
See Louis Perreau-Saussine, Forum Conveniens and Anti-Suit Injunctions Before
French Courts: Recent Developments, 59 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 519, 523–25 (2010) (discussing how the French court has loosened up the strict prohibition against ASI).
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clause. Some SSOs, such as ETSI, already have a choice of law clause in
place. 515 It would make sense for the French courts to be designated by the
forum selection clause to have jurisdiction over the same FRAND matters
originating from ETSI. This is illustrated by the conflicting interpretation of
French law in several litigations around the world involving the interpretation
of French law on the enforceability issue, i.e. the extent to which a SEP implementer can enforce the FRAND commitment against a SEP holder under
French law. 516 Despite applying the same French law, the U.S. and English
courts found enforceability, while the Japanese and Korean courts rejected
enforceability. 517 This inconsistency can be avoided if the ETSI policy has
designated French court as the exclusive forum in the first place. No one
should doubt that the French court is best suited to decide matters of French
law. This is particularly the case for FRAND matters, an evolving and controversial area of law that requires development and refinement by courts.
Thus, a benefit of including an exclusive jurisdiction clause is the streamlining of application of national law that is designated by the choice of law
clause in the IP policy, if any. For SSOs without a choice of law clause in
place, the designation of a forum under the clause can result in a heated debate
among its members since each member would most likely want its home court
to be the designated court. This suggests that choice may not be an easy process. However, this heated debate at SSO ex ante is always less costly than
litigation in courts ex post. Thus, the inclusion of the exclusive forum selection clause, while not perfect, is still the best solution.
Finally, drafting of the exact exclusive forum selection clause will require consideration of its enforceability in multiple jurisdictions (more than
the six jurisdictions covered here). While this is a task beyond the scope of
the article, a few points must be noted. The SSOs should hire sophisticated
lawyers to carefully draft such clauses to avoid most invalidity problems,
such as the lack of formality. 518 It is also clear that the tendency of certain
jurisdictions to resist surrendering of jurisdiction, such as those in the second
group above, will not pose a barrier to binding the SEP owners under the
forum selection clause. The Ninth Circuit succinctly stated this point in Microsoft: “[a]lthough patents themselves are not extraterritorial, there is no reason a party may not freely agree to reservations or limitations on rights that it
would have under foreign patent law (or any other rights that it may have
under foreign law) in a contract enforceable in U.S. courts.” 519
However, the enforceability of such a clause against standard implementers could be an issue, as this appears to vary across different jurisdictions. In
515.
See EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 281, at 47.
516.
See Tsang & Lee, supra note 30, at 292.
517.
Id. at 292.
518.
See, e.g., SUPREME PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 322, art. 29 (requiring forum selection
clause to be in writing).
519.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012).

May 2022]

The Ping-Pong Olympics of Antisuit Injunction

377

Apple, the court was of the opinion that, unlike the SEP owners who entered
into contracts with SSOs to offer FRAND compliant licenses to the implementers, the implementers themselves were not parties to those contracts and
are therefore not bound to accept the license. 520 The same logic appears to
apply to forum selection clauses as well, thus leaving implementers able to
initiate FRAND litigations in courts other than the one designated in the exclusive forum selection clause. Similarly, under Chinese law, a forum selection clause may not bind a third party even if he or she knows the existence
of the clause. 521 It is thus possible that an exclusive forum selection clause
would only bind SEP owners and give the standard implementers more leverage in the FRAND negotiations. While this is a valid concern, there are four
reasons why this will not be a significant problem.
First, as Part IV has shown, most of the conflicting ASIs involve SEP
owners filing patent infringement suits after the standard implementers’ actions requesting courts to set FRAND terms. 522 Even if this forum selection
clause only binds SEP owners, it will still substantially reduce parallel litigations.
Second, applying the same logic as Apple, courts that consider standard
implementers not bound by SSO policies would also be less likely issue ASIs
against foreign proceedings in the first place. There would thus be no conflicting injunctions, even if there were still parallel proceedings. In addition,
if the foreign proceedings initiated by the implementer simply relate to challenging the validity or essentiality of foreign patents, these parallel proceedings are unlikely to be vexatious to the main proceedings regarding the setting
of FRAND terms locally. This is the view of the UK Supreme Court in Unwired. As highlighted above, the contingency of the invalidity of foreign patents could be considered in the formula set by the court in its determination
of FRAND rates. 523
Third, even if the proposal may have the potential to be in favor of the
implementers and thus create a holdout problem, whether the holdout problem actually exists is still unclear. Scholars, practitioners, and courts have
debated whether a holdout problem exists in the FRAND context. 524 On the
one hand, under holdout theory, an implementer can use FRAND terms to
avoid good-faith negotiation, delay royalty payment, or even force an SEP

520.
See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145835, at *32 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017).
521.
See TANG ET AL., supra note 242, at 70.
522.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash.
2012); Xiaomi Tongxun Jishu Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Gongsi (ሿ㊣䙊䇟ᢰᵟޜਨ䇹Ӕӂᮠ
ᆇޜਨ) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Holdings, Inc.], E 01 Zhi Min Chu No.
431 (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 23, 2020) (China).
523.
See supra text accompanying notes 361–62.
524.
See, e.g., Garry A. Gabison, A Two-Dimensional Approach to Non-Discriminatory
Terms in FRAND Licensing Agreements, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 100, 130–31 (2018).
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holder to agree to a sub-market royalty. 525 On the other hand, some have argued that holdout is just a hypothetical tale that has never happened in the
information and communications industry.526 Nevertheless, as ASIs have become an effective weapon for standard implementers to stop SEP holders’
infringement lawsuits, the concerns of holdout appear more than hypothetical. As courts in France, Germany, and India indicated, ASIs may be used to
unfairly restrict patentees’ property rights. 527 Therefore, from a policy perspective, one of the justifications for stopping the ASI game in the FRAND
arena is to alleviate the holdout problem.
Fourth, in cases where, despite all the above considerations, the foreign
proceeding initiated by the implementer is indeed vexatious, then it is the
perfect occasion to issue an ASI against the implementer. Although the issuance of an ASI is much more straightforward in the case of violation of the
exclusive forum selection clause, the presence of such a clause is not a must,
and the common law jurisdictions, at least, should have no problem issuing
ASIs based on vexation. 528 As Bermann put it, “[g]iven their independent bases in prior commitments by the parties, such claims simply do not connote
the intrusiveness and insult to foreign nations to which courts entertaining
issuance of international anti-suit injunctions need to be alert.” 529
An even more progressive proposal is to include future implementers in
the IP policy in the first place so as to make them parties to the FRAND commitment. This can be achieved by making the SEP holders providing the
FRAND undertaking not only to the SSO, but also to all the other SSO members. Since most of the SSO members will be the relevant SEP’s future implementers, this will effectively subject most SEP future implementers to the
FRAND commitments. This proposal will not only make the exclusive jurisdiction clause binding on all parties, but also binding on the FRAND commitment as well. If this is to be adopted, much of the enforceability issue that
has plagued numerous courts will also be resolved as future implementers
will be original parties to the contract. It is clear that this proposal is much
broader than the ASI related issues covered by this article and will involve
changing the existing FRAND undertaking structure in general. It will, however, be a direction to be explored by scholars in the future.

525.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 704; Richard A. Epstein
& Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND,
and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1384 (2017); Spulber, supra note 34, at
122.
526.
See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make
FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2120 (2018).
527.
See supra Part IV.D–F.
528.
See Bermann, supra note 2, at 622–23.
529.
Id. at 623.
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C. Evaluation of Other Proposals
Although there are multiple proposals regarding the resolution of the
FRAND dispute, most of them have not considered the inefficiency brought
about by ASIs and subsequent legal proceedings. Instead, they explore desirable approaches to determine the FRAND rate. In this section, we examine
proposals that might plausibly stop the transnational ASI ping-pong games in
FRAND litigations.
Being aware of the multinational nature of FRAND disputes, Eli Greenbaum has suggested that SSOs should include a forum selection clause in their
IP policies, 530 a proposal similar to ours. As Greenbaum convincingly argued,
with a forum selection clause effectively implemented, national courts will
be less likely to impose FRAND rates and issue ASIs for other jurisdictions. 531 Consequently, the insertion of a forum selection clause will not only
protect comity among jurisdictions but also provide more legal certainty for
parties in the resolution of FRAND disputes. 532 Greenbaum, therefore, proposes that this clause should provide that, absent from other agreements, “the
national courts of each country will have jurisdiction for FRAND licensing
determinations only for patents issued by that territory.” 533 While we agree
with the viewpoint that the inclusion of a forum selection clause in the IP
policies of SSOs is ideal, we argue that the clause should designate the jurisdiction that is home to the law specified in the choice of law clause (e.g.,
French courts for ETSI) instead of the national court where the patent is
granted, because the jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction resolution of FRAND disputes will decrease efficiency by fragmenting FRAND-related decisions.
This fragmentation is undesirable because it is neither in line with the global
nature of the FRAND license nor beneficial to the goal of international standard adoption. 534 The designation of forum to the jurisdiction where the patent
was granted will lead to numerous FRAND litigations in different countries
and de-facto jurisdiction-specific FRAND licenses. The resulting inefficiency is well put by English Justice Birss in Unwired that “[licensor and
licensee acting reasonably and on a willing basis] would regard country by
country licensing as madness. A worldwide licence would be far more efficient.” 535 Thus, in addition to the clear advantages of Greenbaum’s proposal,
our proposal will better promote the international social welfare of standards
adoption.

530.
Greenbaum, supra note 37, at 1119.
531.
Id. at 1119–20.
532.
Id. at 1123.
533.
Id. at 1117.
534.
Cf. Gabison, supra note 42, at 143–44 (arguing that jurisdiction-specific FRAND
licenses are inefficient).
535.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [543]
(Eng.).
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Some commentators suggest that arbitration is the best way to resolve
FRAND disputes, especially FRAND rates; 536 therefore, an arbitration clause
should be included in the IP policy documents of SSOs. 537 While there have
been different viewpoints regarding how a FRAND rate can be decided by
the arbitration tribunal, 538 arbitration provides a confidential, efficient, and
professional venue to resolve international commercial disputes. 539 Furthermore, it is not too costly for SSOs to include an arbitration clause in relevant
FRAND documents. This is why several SSOs have already required their
members to resolve their disputes via binding arbitration clause. 540 More importantly, by centralizing the dispute resolution in one single venue, arbitration procedures can avoid the costs and conflicts of ASIs and subsequent legal
proceedings in multiple jurisdictions. 541 Nevertheless, we argue that given the
proliferation of ASIs around the world, the court is still a more ideal venue
than arbitration to resolve FRAND disputes. Compared to privately conducted arbitration proceedings, court decisions provide important information to stakeholders by publishing reasoning therein. First, the disclosure
of court decisions provides more certainty for potential SEP holders and
standard implementers, and this certainty will eventually encourage the widespread adoption of standards. Second, since court decisions are made based
on the law and are subject to public scrutiny, they need to maintain a much
higher degree of consistency than arbitration awards. Third, as SEP-related
issues are complicated and fast developing, court decisions, as opposed to
undisclosed arbitration awards, are better suited to advance the theoretical
and practical development of relevant legal doctrines. 542 While some supporters of arbitration suggest that arbitration tribunals have the discretion to disclose its approach to FRAND rate calculation to antitrust authorities, courts,
536.
See, e.g., Julien Chaisse & A. Marisport, Arbitration of FRAND Disputes in SEP
Licensing: Towards Global Substantive and Procedural Rules, 2021 INTELL. PROP. Q. 264,
276–77.
537.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1144.
538.
Id.
539.
See, e.g., Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELB. J. INT’L L. 205, 206 (2005); Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Agreements—Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 152, 164 (2009); Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 53, 65 (2005).
540.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 730.
541.
Guillaume Areou & Christophe Arfan, The Use of Arbitration in FRAND Disputes,
2021 INT’L BUS. L.J. 327, 339; see also Chaisse & Marisport, supra note 536, at 279 (arguing
that arbitration is a centralized dispute resolution mechanism which can avoid “colossal waste
of time, money and resources of parties”).
542.
Cf. Liu, supra note 36, at 675 (“[A] drawback of ADR is that it lacks the positive
externality of a litigation. Its results will not be published, and no teaching and research on and
oversight over the licensing of SEPs will be possible. Relevant knowledge will not be accumulated for and disseminated to the public.”).
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and SEP holders and standard implementers, 543 this proposal still fails to include the public scrutiny, which is essential to the development of legal approaches to FRAND disputes. Given these concerns, an exclusive forum selection clause is more suitable for resolving FRAND disputes than an
arbitration clause in SSOs’ IP policies.
Several other proposals seem plausible in theory but are unrealistic in
practice. For example, some have suggested that SSOs should establish their
own dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve FRAND disputes. 544 This proposal is unrealistic because it neglects the political realities within SSOs. The
participants of standard setting normally have conflicting commercial interests with regard to their own technologies and products; therefore, standard
setting is typically a process of compromise by these participants. 545 To maintain a neutral status in standard setting and subsequent adoption, none of the
SSOs have defined FRAND terms; several SSOs even have explicitly refused
to define it. 546 Given the SSOs’ clear intention of being neutral from members’ FRAND disputes, it is impractical to expect them to set up sui generis
mechanisms for FRAND dispute resolution.
A more progressive approach proposed by Professor Jorge L. Contreras
is to set up an international FRAND tribunal under SSO policy. 547 While this
proposal shares our proposal’s goal of resolving FRAND disputes through
private ordering and avoiding inconsistent decisions across jurisdictions, its
degree of difficulty is much higher. The main challenge of this proposal is
not inserting the tribunal provision into the SSO policy, but rather the difficulties in reaching a consensus regarding how to establish this tribunal and
its procedures among a critical mass of SSOs and other stakeholders. The
launch of this tribunal requires support from not only SSOs but also their
members. Parties with diverse economic and political interests will certainly

543.
Chaisse & Marisport, supra note 536, at 277. But see Yoonhee Kim, Lifting Confidentiality of FRAND Royalties in SEP Arbitration, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 23–32
(2014) (proposing to completely lift confidentiality of FRAND royalties in SEP arbitration).
544.
See, e.g., ALBERT A. FOER & SANDEEP VAHEESAN, AM. ANTITRUST INST., REQUEST
FOR JOINT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON THE PATENT POLICIES OF STANDARD SETTING
ORGANIZATIONS: PETITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 17 (2013), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Requestfor-Joint-Enforcement-Guidelines-on-the-Patent-Policies-of-Standard-Setting-Organizations.pdf;
Liu, supra note 36, at 675.
545.
See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Implementing Procedural Safeguards for the Development of Bioinformatics Interoperability Standards, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 87, 113 (2012); Jorge L.
Contreras, supra note 50, at 577–78; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing the Public
International Legal System, 88 KY. L.J. 885, 950 (2000).
546.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 705; see also Knut Blind
& Brian Kahin, Standards and the Global Economy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 7, 15 (Jorge
L. Contreras ed., 2017) (indicating that SSOs “have been reluctant to enter the broader debate
about licensing standards”).
547.
See, e.g., Contreras, Global Rate Setting, supra note 42, at 739.
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have different viewpoints on the substantive and procedural rules of this tribunal. While on the surface of this proposal, nation states are not involved in
the establishing the proposed tribunal, those considering their substantial national interest in FRAND-encumbered SEPs will likely influence the design
of the tribunal and its procedures through the SSO members. This is the case
for initiatives on the harmonization of private international law. Speaking to
the difficulties in reaching consensus on intellectual property related matters,
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil or Commercial Matters has excluded intellectual properties from the
scope of the Convention. 548 Although it is ideal to have a new tribunal specifically devoted to resolving FRAND disputes, the political and economic
reality will likely prevent the proposal’s realization.
While tailor-made international dispute resolution mechanisms for IP and
similar rights have existed in other arenas, this model cannot be easily applied
to FRAND disputes. For example, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Proceeding has become an international norm for resolving domain name disputes. 549
However, it should be noted that this unique procedure was developed with
the support of the U.S. government and World Intellectual Property Organization in the 1990s, when domain name disputes were not quite common. 550
Given the intertwined international economic interest underlying FRAND issues, using an existing court system is a much more practical and less costly
solution than setting up a new international tribunal, not to mention the fact
that parties involved in increasing ASIs and other FRAND disputes cannot
afford the enormous time required for stakeholders to reach a consensus regarding the details of establishing such a tribunal.
Even if the proposal of international FRAND tribunal is eventually implemented after long negotiation among various stakeholders, the increasing
FRAND disputes need to be resolved in an efficient way before that really
happens. As illustrated above, our proposal is still the most cost-effective way
to eliminate the fragmentation of FRAND decisions by numerous national
courts and the collateral ping-pong game of ASIs before a more costly transnational dispute resolution mechanism is developed. It does not require a critical mass of SSOs to reach a unanimous consent on numerous key issues,
such as the proposal to establish an international tribunal on FRAND and the
composition of the tribunal. According to our proposal, each SSO can decide

548.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters, art. 2(1)(m), July 2, 2019, https://www.hcch.net /en/instruments/conventions
/full-text/?cid=137.
549.
See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, Domain Name Dispute Resolution in Mainland China and Hong
Kong, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TRADEMARK
LAW 398, 399 (Irene Calboli & Jane Ginsburg eds., 2020).
550.
See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—
Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 613–33 (2002).
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on its own whether to include an exclusive jurisdiction clause. As more SSOs
adopt this approach, they will influence others to do the same.

VI. CONCLUSION
ASIs and AASIs concerning FRAND-encumbered SEPs have become
increasingly common across different jurisdictions in recent years. This is
partly because of the tensions between the national courts’ jurisdictions and
the transnational nature of standards and corresponding FRAND licenses.
When a national court is adjudicating a FRAND case, the determination of a
global FRAND rate inevitably has an impact on FRAND activities in other
jurisdictions. Consequently, the court may use an ASI as a tool to ensure that
the determined FRAND rate is not thwarted in other jurisdictions. However,
we have seen an increase in conflicting ASIs that are conducive to neither
global standardization nor international comity.
Against this backdrop, this Article makes three novel contributions. First,
it explains the reasons behind the sudden surge in ASIs and AASIs since
2019. This is not a coincidence, but the result of significant national interests
in standardized technologies and the very nature of FRAND licenses, which
are devoid of international regulatory governance and must be assessed by
national courts with different choice of law rules. Second, armed with this
general observation, this Article delves further into the differing national interests and legal traditions that drive the approaches toward FRAND disputes
adopted by different jurisdictions. It is clear that countries in the first group
(the United States and China) are much more aggressive in issuing ASIs due
to their greater interest in regulating FRAND disputes globally. This is in
contrast against the second group (England, France, Germany, and India),
which lacks the same economic dominance as the first group, but instead focuses on national interests grounded on territoriality and the protection of
property rights, leading to defensive measures represented by AASIs. Finally,
this Article proposes that the most practical solution is to include an exclusive
forum selection clause in the SSO policies. This builds on the existing practice of inclusion of choice-of-law clauses in some SSO policies and the existing private international law rules of most jurisdictions which recognize such
clauses. These clauses will effectively eliminate parallel proceedings in the
first place and thus reduce undesirable social costs stemming from ASIs.

